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* Von 2001 bis 2006 nur Gästebuch, erst ab 2007 auch Webforen und Weblogs.

NACH OBEN 491) Arminius, 19.06.2014, 09:34, 10:31, 10:42 (1401-1403)

1401

I don't go into details of my theory, because it would require a lot of space, but some aspects of other current physical theories, especially of the cosmological „mainstream“ theories, have to be called into question, because they seem to contradict spiral-cyclicity.

So the time arrow can also be called into question, because we really don't know much about our universe (and perhaps other universes), the black holes, the so called „dark matter“, the so so called „dark energy“, the „big bang“, the „inflation of our universe“, and the fact whether the universe is really closed or not, which leads to another problem: the entropy of our universe, including the specific direction of its time arrow.

1402

A system of government does not have to be ruled by a so called „elite“ of „academic experts“, but merely functionaries, because the so called „elite“ of „academic experts“ can, should be slaves (and they are!) and/or machines (and they are!). You merely need functionaries for technocracy. Rulers have merely one purpose: control (power). So what are all rulers doing in order to control? They are enslaving humans and/or creating machines by enslaved functionaries and/or machines. The risk is that there will be at last merely machines.

Because humans act in this way, their end is clear. The question is only: When?

1403

Copied post in another thread.

 

NACH OBEN 492) Arminius, 20.06.2014, 10:42, 11:33, 12:40, 19:40, 20:11, 20:47, 20:57 (1404-1410)

1404

James S. Saint wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»My theory is that in our universe bodies move in a spiral-cyclical way.

The orbits of both moons around their planets and the planets around their stars, and even the stars around their galactic center clearly do not describe circles or ellipses, but spirals. For example, while our Sun spirally orbits the center of our galaxy, the Earth spirally orbits the sun, and our Moon spirally orbits the Earth. For bodies that move around bodies, which also move around bodies, do not move two-, but three-dimensionally. They move spirally and thus also cyclically, more precisely said: in a spiral-cyclical way. If something moves around a body or a point which does not move around another body or point and is not moved in a different way by external forces, then (and only then) can this (and only this) motion be two-dimensional.« ** **

That seems certainly reasonable.“ **

Yes, of course.

James S. Saint wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»My whole (natural and cultural) theory is based on spiral-cyclic motions - almost all developments, thus also evolution and history.« ** **

I would be interested in how the cyclic motion relates to evolution and history.“ **

The theory is based on analogies. For example: Sun and technique (technology), planets and cultures, moons and economies, other bodies and art. The pre-condition I made is that the problem of the „dualism“ between nature and culture can be overcome by analogies. In addition to the great „dualism“ between nature and culture there are three other „dualisms“; so actually there are four „dualisms“, thus one „quadrialism“ - four regions, and each region has two subregions; so I've got eight subregions (little „worlds“), and this eight „worlds“ are: (1) physical, (2) chemical, (3) biological, (4) economical, (5) semiotical (incl. psycholgical/sociological), (6) linguistical, (7) philosophical, (8) mathematical. We can combine them: I (1 and 2), II (3 and 4), III (5 and 6), IV (7 and 8 ); or: A (1,2,3,4 or 1,2,3,8) and B (5,6,7,8 or 4,5,6,7). We can also combine them in this way, which makes the quadrialism clearer: (1 or I) natural, (2 or II) natural-cultural, (3 or III) cultural, (4 or IV) cultural-natural; and the eight „worlds“: (1a or Ia) physical, (1b or Ib) chemical, (2a or IIa) biological, (2b or IIb) economical, (3a or IIIa) semiotical, (3b or IIIb) linguistical, (4a or IVa) philosophical, (4b or IVb) mathematical. But the principal point is the analogy by itself, just in principle. It is very much stuff! So it is very much text too!

**

** ** ** ** **

James S. Saint wrote:

Arminius wrote:

»Most of the ›laws‹ of the quantum physics had been called into question before it became apparent that much of quantum physics can not be wrong because a dental drill and a cd player really work. ** **

Quantum Mechanics is strictly about statistical data, having no theorizing involved. Quantum Physics is an imaginative effort to bring solipsism and magic into science. QP is a conflation of the description of reality with reality itself, the conflation of the map with the terrain. I have yet to find anything of QP to be valid. QP is the notion, not of »mind over matter«, but rather »mind IS matter«. In QP, the equation itself is the physical reality and causative force, not merely a description of it. CD players and dentist drills work for entirely different reasons.
Which »entirely different reasons« do you mean?“ **

James S. Saint wrote:

Arminius wrote:

»The four fundamental forces of nature should not be generally called into question, but some of the ›laws‹ of thermodynamics, or the theory of the ›big bang‹ and the theory of the ›inflation of the universe‹ should be called into question because there is no absolute proof or evidence, but merely laboratory experiments, statistics, modeling, and - of course - claims for them.

I have discovered that the Standard Model in contemporary physics is not an entirely accurate ontology. In RM:AO, there are no actual »forces«. What appears to be forces in physics is actually merely dynamic migration. And the »strong« and »weak« forces don't actually exist at all. They are merely aberrant effects (Charged Particle Behavior).“ **

If „the »strong« and »weak« forces don't actually exist at all“, as you are saying, why do you then mention them in your „affectance ontology“?

1405


Phoneutria wrote:

„One must aim for the balance of refining the old, while respecting it.
It is every generation's duty to improve on the previous one, not to deface it.“ **

Would you mind going into details?

1406

James S. Saint wrote:

„Well, I understand the issue of analogies, but I still don't see the relation to cyclical-spirals. What for example is spiraling and toward what focus point concerning psychology?“ **

Please look at the following pictures again:

Spiralbewegungen Spiralbewegungen

Now please imagine, there is not a spiralic, but merely a cyclic „way“. What do you see and think then? I guess you see and think that there is an action replay, an iteration, a recurrence, a reapeat, a repetition, a rerun ... and so on. That's the relation to the cyclicity - in any case (for example: physical, chemical, biological, economical, semiotical [incl. pscholgical/sociological], lingustical, philosophical, mathematical]). And now please imagine, there is not merely a cyclic, but also a spiralic „way“ - then, of course, the cyclic „way“ becomes a more relativised cyclic „way“, but that doesn't matter, because it is just an impression. I think that devolopment (incl. evolution and history [**|**|**|**]) is certainly a spiral-cyclic „way“ which merely perhaps follows the time arrow - the former and not the latter is important for my theory.

The „house of change“:

| History |
|___ Evolution ___|
|______ Development ______|
|_____________ Change _____________|

History is merely the „roof“ of the „house of change“.

Time and the „house of change“:

| History |
|___ Evolution ___|
|______ Development ______|
|_____________ Change _____________|

------------------------------------------------------------------------
_____________________ Time ______________________

History is merely the „roof“ of the „house of change“.

You probably know the meaning of „hyperonym“ („superordination“) and „hyponym“ („subordination“). My interpetation of „change“, „development“, „evolution“, „history“ in their structural relations to each other is the following one:

1) „Change“ is the hyperonym of the hyponyms „development“, „evolution“ and „history“.
1,1) „Development“ is a hyponym of the hyperonym „change“ and the hyperonym of the hyponyms „evolution“ and „history“.
1,1,1) „Evolution“ is a hyponym of the hyperonyms „change“ and „development“ and the hyperonym of the hyponym „history“.
1,1,1,1) „History“ is merely a hyponym, namely of the hyperonyms „change“, „development“ and „evolution“.

That consequently means: if history ends, evolution or development or even change do not have to end simultaneously; and if evolution ends, history ends simultaneously, but development and change do not have to end simultaneously; and if development ends, evolution and history end simultaneously, but change does not have to end simultaneously. So in that relation merely change is independent. Development depends only on change. Evolution depends on change and development. History is the most dependent, because it depends on change, development, and evolution.

You may compare (1) change with our universe in time, (1,1) development with our sun, our planet, or our moon ... etc., (1,1,1) evolution with a living being (for example an alga, or a snake, or a human being without history ... etc., and (1,1,1,1) history with a - of course - historical human being.

They all belong to 1 (change), and merely historical human beings belong to 1,1,1,1 (history).

The history of cultures (civilisations) is also a spiral-cyclic move - psychologically (I prefer the word semiotically) cognizable, because cultures have something like a soul or psyche ans their own original symbolics.

1407

James S. Saint wrote:

„I am thinking that you are talking about, for example, the rising and falling of a civilization type, perhaps Roman in nature. In such a case, I can see the two dimensions of time and the rise and fall of the civilization type, but that would be merely a two dimensional wave. For there to be a spiral, three dimensions are required. What would the third dimension be?“ **

You call it „wave“, and that's not wrong, but not exactly worded. Exactly worded it is – of course – a spiral-cyclic move (which may be also called „wave“). The third dimension is – for example – a kind of technique (technology) or the human evolution (eventually human history, but I doubt that a real human history - in general - exists, because I believe that, referring to all humans, merely cultural history of humans exists). The most interesting point (especially for you, James) is, that the medium, which „communicates” with the cultural „actors“ could be „affectance“ or a kind of an „aether“.

Planets, moons, and other bodies of a solar system can merely then exist, if a star has „created“ them. And so it is for cultures, economies, and art (artefacts) as well: cultures, economies, and arts (artefacts) can merely exist, if a technique (technology) has „created“ them. Such a technique can also be a cultural technique, if any culture already exists. Important is that there must be three dimensions when it comes to „start“ such a culture (unfortunately the English language requires the word „civilisation“) as described. If there are merely two dimensions, then there are merely techniques as the „primitive“ cultures possible, and they are very important as the third dimension for „higher“ cultures.

The spiral motion of suns and techniques are quite powerful and quite generous. In their systems, they are even absolutely powerful and absolutely generous; because like every sun in its system any technique in its system is the absolute tyrant and the absolute sponsor.

It is very likely that it is a superior technique of all of nature or what we call the universe, which is identical with what we call creation. Whether we call the creator God, the „unmoved mover“, the „big bang-maker“, the „universe builder“, the „string musician“ or simply the „original technician“, that is perhaps more a matter of faith, religious sensitivities and the theological justifications than one of the exact knowledge; but at the beginning everything needs an impulse, a help from - despite the later self-help. I believe that there are several other characteristics, namely different spiral cycles-setting techniques in addition to the initial technique, to some extent as descendants of the early technology, the original technique.

So also a culture needs energy, force to ever come into motion and thus development, or point(s), bodies, „parents“ of culture (s) as the start or forerun or circuit object, an object of its spiral cycle.

As we move spirally through the universe, we turn simultaneously to ourselves.

1408

Uglypeoplefucking wrote:

„We have George W Bush and his administration to thank for ISIS!“ **

No, at least not only. It was a well calculated aggression, but a well calculated troop withdrawal as well; so we have to thank both George W. Bush and Barack Obama; and probably we will have to thank Obama's followers as well.

1409

Come back, Laughing Man, Tyler Durden, James L. Walker, Tyrannus, Joker!

1410

The Observer (Sunday 27 April 2014):

„It's no joke – the robots will really take over this time.
If capitalism can outsource low-paid jobs, why can't it replace the middle classes with automatons? ....

„Welcome to the future: a robot working in an office.“ **

„Working in an office“? Will that be necessary at all?

Probably no!

 

NACH OBEN 493) Arminius, 21.06.2014, 00:54, 00:55, 19:20 (1411-1413)

1411

Not the US president, but the most powerful men of the world calculated well. The US president merely works for them.

1412

For your future boyfriend? **

1413

Contra-Nietzsche, do you think I am a Nietzschean? If so: why are you permanently suspecting that all people around you are Nietzscheans?

The US and the USSR - the former is the current USSR, the latter (perhaps) the current US - have no ideologies?

What you are saying has much to do with ideology. Have you really never noticed that? Your scapegoat theory is a conspiracy, based on an ideology (= modern religion).

In addition: If one is catholic, then one does not automatically incarnate the truth. I know that very well because I am catholic. I think you have to learn that.

It is not historically true what you are saying. And I didn't say that X or Y rules, but merely that the US president has NEVER been ruling. That is a difference, maybe not for you, but it IS a difference.

If the US president were not a functionary - a slave -, he would not be paid, but he IS paid! That is not a x or y theory, but that what the mainstream itself is saying.

YOUR president has nothing to say, and that fact makes you angry. I would also prefer a strong president, but he does not exist. You will perhaps experience that YOUR presidents have always been being functionaries.

 

NACH OBEN 494) Arminius, 22.06.2014, 01:05, 01:15, 13:07, 20:13, 20:20, 21:14, 22:22 (1414-1420)

1414

Interesting, James (**), but please tell me what is life for you!

You are projecting physical phenomenons on sociological phenomenons.

And how does it end when a society has a „negaitive“ ambient field or nature as an antithesis? Does it end with, in, or as a synthesis?

Or for example: If the thesis is a society with entropy (or anti-entropy) and its antithesis an ambient field with anti-entropy (or entropy), is then the synthesis a society with an-entropy, with „anentropic harmony“?

1415

James S. Saint wrote:

„Perhaps this will help; The Communal Particle.

A tipping point is reached where there is no longer a choice, whether the society has artificial support or just happens to have chosen the wrong thing to call »Positive«.“ **

I have read your op of that thread and answered:

Arminius wrote:

„Interesting, James, but please tell me what is life for you!

You are projecting physical phenomenons on sociological phenomenons.

And how does it end when a society has a »negaitive« ambient field or nature as an antithesis? Does it end with, in, or as a synthesis?

Or for example: If the thesis is a society with entropy (or anti-entropy) and its antithesis an ambient field with anti-entropy (or entropy), is then the synthesis a society with an-entropy, with »anentropic harmony«?“ ** **

A society or culture has to have a real antithesis (and not a artificial one), else it can't be a real thesis. But if it is a real thesis with a real antithesis, then it becomes sooner or later a synthesis. And after that this sysnthesis becomes the new thesis, either a real or not a real one. The older a society (culture) the more artificial its thesis and so on.

1416

James S. Saint wrote:

„Life only has one Thesis. Thus it only has one Anti-thesis. But life includes the act of learning and adjusting accordingly. The issue is when people try to hold onto a set of adjustments that no longer apply and thus stop learning.

When they can't clearly discern life from non-life, they guess. And when they believe that they have guessed correctly, they try to hold onto it. They become religious about it. So they err in two ways. First they err by not understanding what Life really is and then they werr by attempting to hold onto that error. Such societies (just about all of them) end up having to almost die out entirely before they are willing to try a different guess. Thus you see change as something they gave up in order to buy into something else of hope (a new page in history).

But in an actual society of Life, many changes are taking place all the time without concern. Thus one can no longer say that a new page has been turned, that is until they lose Life and begin the road to death. There is no »new synthesis« to an actual life.“ **

A NEW THESIS, James, because the synthesis becomes a new thesis. Life with no synthesis would be very boring, merely acting (thesis) and reacting (antithesis), no qualitative change. There would be no qualitative development without any synthesis (and further: no new thesis). Humans changed their lives - compare the humans of the Stone Age and the humans of the last 6000 years.

Without any synthesis life would be merely a ping pong game because it would merely consist of thesis and antithesis, for example: action and reaction.

1417

James S. Saint wrote:

„I think that what you are calling a »new thesis« is what I call merely »learning«.“ **

Yes and no - because I meant it more as a kind of development as in Hegel’s „Dialektik“ (thesis => antithesis => synthesis), but also in a kind of a learning process (which is also a development, but not a so much general one as the dialectic process). One doesn't have to be a 100% Hegelian in order to use his „Dialektik“. But in this case it fits once again.

Obe wrote:

„Learning and synthesis, they are at least, relational terms. But what of this relationship? What is being synthesized? And how is that learned? The fact is, they are not always synonymous, and a »learned« synthesis is one which has become a new thesis, and an unlearned one is still a synthetic. But at least it has the potential to be learned, so it is an a-priori synthetic.

But besides being only terms, their potentiality, when given the opportunity to become actual, will apply to specific situations, and hence become a new analytic: the new thesis.“ **

Yes, one could say it in this way too.

1418

James S. Saint wrote:

„Zinnat wrote:

»Moving out from this cycle for ever is Nirvana/enlightenment.« **

And that is what I have been calling »Anentropic Harmony«.“ **

So for you „Anentropic Harmony“ is „Nirvana“?

1419

Excerpts from Francis Fukuyama's „End of History“ (**):

„The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism. ....

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of Foreign Affair's yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in. the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run. To understand how this is so, we must first consider some theoretical issues concerning the nature of historical change.

THE NOTION of the end of history is not an original one. Its best known propagator was Karl Marx, who believed that the direction of historical development was a purposeful one determined by the interplay of material forces, and would come to an end only with the achievement of a communist utopia that would finally resolve all prior contradictions. But the concept of history as a dialectical process with a beginning, a middle, and an end was borrowed by Marx from his great German predecessor, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

For better or worse, much of Hegel's historicism has become part of our contemporary intellectual baggage. The notion that mankind has progressed through a series of primitive stages of consciousness on his path to the present, and that these stages corresponded to concrete forms of social organization, such as tribal, slave-owning, theocratic, and finally democratic-egalitarian societies, has become inseparable from the modern understanding of man. Hegel was the first philosopher to speak the language of modern social science, insofar as man for him was the product of his concrete historical and social environment and not, as earlier natural right theorists would have it, a collection of more or less fixed »natural« attributes. The mastery and transformation of man's natural environment through the application of science and technology was originally not a Marxist concept, but a Hegelian one. Unlike later historicists whose historical relativism degenerated into relativism tout court, however, Hegel believed that history culminated in an absolute moment - a moment in which a final, rational form of society and state became victorious.

It is Hegel's misfortune to be known now primarily as Marx's precursor; and it is our misfortune that few of us are familiar with Hegel's work from direct study, but only as it has been filtered through the distorting lens of Marxism. In France, however, there has been an effort to save Hegel from his Marxist interpreters and to resurrect him as the philosopher who most correctly speaks to our time. Among those modern French interpreters of Hegel, the greatest was certainly Alexandre Kojève, a brilliant Russian émigré who taught a highly influential series of seminars in Paris in the 1930s at the Ecole Practique des Hautes Etudes. While largely unknown in the United States, Kojève had a major impact on the intellectual life of the continent. Among his students ranged such future luminaries as Jean-Paul Sartre on the Left and Raymond Aron on the Right; postwar existentialism borrowed many of its basic categories from Hegel via Kojève.

Kojève sought to resurrect the Hegel of the Phenomenology of Mind, the Hegel who proclaimed history to be at an end in 1806. For as early as this Hegel saw in Napoleon's defeat of the Prussian monarchy at the Battle of Jena the victory of the ideals of the French Revolution, and the imminent universalization of the state incorporating the principles of liberty and equality. Kojève, far from rejecting Hegel in light of the turbulent events of the next century and a half, insisted that the latter had been essentially correct. The Battle of Jena marked the end of history because it was at that point that the vanguard of humanity (a term quite familiar to Marxists) actualized the principles of the French Revolution. While there was considerable work to be done after 1806 - abolishing slavery and the slave trade, extending the franchise to workers, women, blacks, and other racial minorities, etc. - the basic principles of the liberal democratic state could not be improved upon. The two world wars in this century and their attendant revolutions and upheavals simply had the effect of extending those principles spatially, such that the various provinces of human civilization were brought up to the level of its most advanced outposts, and of forcing those societies in Europe and North America at the vanguard of civilization to implement their liberalism more fully.

The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects through a system of law man's universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed. .... Here is no struggle or conflict over »large« issues, and consequently no need for generals or statesmen; what remains is primarily economic activity. .... Believing that there was no more work for philosophers as well, since Hegel (correctly understood) had already achieved absolute knowledge, Kojève left teaching after the war and spent the remainder of his life working as a bureaucrat in the European Economic Community, until his death in 1968.

FOR HEGEL, the contradictions that drive history exist first of all in the realm of human consciousness, i.e. on the level of ideas - not the trivial election year proposals of American politicians, but ideas in the sense of large unifying world views that might best be understood under the rubric of ideology. Ideology in this sense is not restricted to the secular and explicit political doctrines we usually associate with the term, but can include religion, culture, and the complex of moral values underlying any society as well.

Hegel's view of the relationship between the ideal and the real or material worlds was an extremely complicated one, beginning with the fact that for him the distinction between the two was only apparent. He did not believe that the real world conformed or could be made to conform to ideological preconceptions of philosophy professors in any simpleminded way, or that the »material« world could not impinge on the ideal. Indeed, Hegel the professor was temporarily thrown out of work as a result of a very material event, the Battle of Jena. But while Hegel's writing and thinking could be stopped by a bullet from the material world, the hand on the trigger of the gun was motivated in turn by the ideas of liberty and equality that had driven the French Revolution.

For Hegel, all human behavior in the material world, and hence all human history, is rooted in a prior state of consciousness - an idea similar to the one expressed by John Maynard Keynes when he said that the views of men of affairs were usually derived from defunct economists and academic scribblers of earlier generations. This consciousness may not be explicit and self-aware, as are modern political doctrines, but may rather take the form of religion or simple cultural or moral habits. And yet this realm of consciousness in the long run necessarily becomes manifest in the material world, indeed creates the material world in its own image. Consciousness is cause and not effect, and can develop autonomously from the material world; hence the real subtext underlying the apparent jumble of current events is the history of ideology.

Hegel's idealism has fared poorly at the hands of later thinkers. Marx reversed the priority of the real and the ideal completely, relegating the entire realm of consciousness - religion, art, culture, philosophy itself - to a »superstructure« that was determined entirely by the prevailing material mode of production. Yet another unfortunate legacy of Marxism is our tendency to retreat into materialist or utilitarian explanations of political or historical phenomena, and our disinclination to believe in the autonomous power of ideas. A recent example of this is Paul Kennedy's hugely successful The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, which ascribes the decline of great powers to simple economic overextension. Obviously, this is true on some level: an empire whose economy is barely above the level of subsistence cannot bankrupt its treasury indefinitely. But whether a highly productive modern industrial society chooses to spend 3 or 7 percent of its GNP on defense rather than consumption is entirely a matter of that society's political priorities, which are in turn determined in the realm of consciousness.

The materialist bias of modern thought is characteristic not only of people on the Left who may be sympathetic to Marxism, but of many passionate Anti-Marxists as well. Indeed, there is on the Right what one might label the Wall Street Journal school of deterministic materialism that discounts the importance of ideology and culture and sees man as essentially a rational, profit-maximizing individual. It is precisely this kind of individual and his pursuit of material incentives that is posited as the basis for economic life as such in economic textbooks. One small example will illustrate the problematic character of such materialist views.

Max Weber begins his famous book, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, by noting the different economic performance of Protestant and Catholic communities throughout Europe and America, summed up in the proverb that Protestants eat well while Catholics sleep well. Weber notes that according to any economic theory that posited man as a rational profit-maximizer, raising the piece-work rate should increase labor productivity. But in fact, in many traditional peasant communities, raising the piece-work rate actually had the opposite effect of lowering labor productivity: at the higher rate, a peasant accustomed to earning two and one-half marks per day found he could earn the same amount by working less, and did so because he valued leisure more than income. The choices of leisure over income, or of the militaristic life of the Spartan hoplite over the wealth of the Athenian trader, or even the ascetic life of the early capitalist entrepreneur over that of a traditional leisured aristocrat, cannot possibly be explained by the impersonal working of material forces, but come preeminently out of the sphere of consciousness - what we have labeled here broadly as ideology. And indeed, a central theme of Weber's work was to prove that contrary to Marx, the material mode of production, far from being the »base«, was itself a »superstructure« with roots in religion and culture, and that to understand the emergence of modern capitalism and the profit motive one had to study their antecedents in the realm of the spirit.

As we look around the contemporary world, the poverty of materialist theories of economic development is all too apparent. The Wall Street Journal school of deterministic materialism habitually points to the stunning economic success of Asia in the past few decades as evidence of the viability of free market economics, with the implication that all societies would see similar development were they simply to allow their populations to pursue their material self-interest freely. Surely free markets and stable political systems are a necessary precondition to capitalist economic growth. But just as surely the cultural heritage of those Far Eastern societies, the ethic of work and saving and family, a religious heritage that does not, like Islam, place restrictions on certain forms of economic behavior, and other deeply ingrained moral qualities, are equally important in explaining their economic performance. And yet the intellectual weight of materialism is such that not a single respectable contemporary theory of economic development addresses consciousness and culture seriously as the matrix within which economic behavior is formed.

FAILURE to understand that the roots of economic behavior lie in the realm of consciousness and culture leads to the common mistake of attributing material causes to phenomena that are essentially ideal in nature. For example, it is commonplace in the West to interpret the reform movements first in China and most recently in the Soviet Union as the victory of the material over the ideal - that is, a recognition that ideological incentives could not replace material ones in stimulating a highly productive modern economy, and that if one wanted to prosper one had to appeal to baser forms of self-interest. But the deep defects of socialist economies were evident thirty or forty years ago to anyone who chose to look. Why was it that these countries moved away from central planning only in the 1980s' The answer must be found in the consciousness of the elites and leaders ruling them, who decided to opt for the »Protestant« life of wealth and risk over the »Catholic« path of poverty and security. That change was in no way made inevitable by the material conditions in which either country found itself on the eve of the reform, but instead came about as the result of the victory of one idea over another.

For Kojève, as for all good Hegelians, understanding the underlying processes of history requires understanding developments in the realm of consciousness or ideas, since consciousness will ultimately remake the material world in its own image. To say that history ended in 1806 meant that mankind's ideological evolution ended in the ideals of the French or American Revolutions: while particular regimes in the real world might not implement these ideals fully, their theoretical truth is absolute and could not be improved upon. Hence it did not matter to Kojève that the consciousness of the postwar generation of Europeans had not been universalized throughout the world; if ideological development had in fact ended, the homogenous state would eventually become victorious throughout the material world.

I have neither the space nor, frankly, the ability to defend in depth Hegel's radical idealist perspective. The issue is not whether Hegel's system was right, but whether his perspective might uncover the problematic nature of many materialist explanations we often take for granted. This is not to deny the role of material factors as such. To a literal-minded idealist, human society can be built around any arbitrary set of principles regardless of their relationship to the material world. And in fact men have proven themselves able to endure the most extreme material hardships in the name of ideas that exist in the realm of the spirit alone, be it the divinity of cows or the nature of the Holy Trinity.

But while man's very perception of the material world is shaped by his historical consciousness of it, the material world can clearly affect in return the viability of a particular state of consciousness. In particular, the spectacular abundance of advanced liberal economies and the infinitely diverse consumer culture made possible by them seem to both foster and preserve liberalism in the political sphere. I want to avoid the materialist determinism that says that liberal economics inevitably produces liberal politics, because I believe that both economics and politics presuppose an autonomous prior state of consciousness that makes them possible. But that state of consciousness that permits the growth of liberalism seems to stabilize in the way one would expect at the end of history if it is underwritten by the abundance of a modern free market economy. We might summarize the content of the universal homogenous state as liberal democracy in the political sphere combined with easy access to VCRs and stereos in the economic.

HAVE WE in fact reached the end of history? Are there, in other words, any fundamental »contradictions« in human life that cannot be resolved in the context of modern liberalism, that would be resolvable by an alternative political-economic structure? If we accept the idealist premises laid out above, we must seek an answer to this question in the realm of ideology and consciousness. Our task is not to answer exhaustively the challenges to liberalism promoted by every crackpot messiah around the world, but only those that are embodied in important social or political forces and movements, and which are therefore part of world history. For our purposes, it matters very little what strange thoughts occur to people in Albania or Burkina Faso, for we are interested in what one could in some sense call the common ideological heritage of mankind.

In the past century, there have been two major challenges to liberalism, those of fascism and of communism. The former saw the political weakness, materialism, anomie, and lack of community of the West as fundamental contradictions in liberal societies that could only be resolved by a strong state that forged a new »people« on the basis of national exclusiveness. Fascism was destroyed as a living ideology by World War II. This was a defeat, of course, on a very material level, but it amounted to a defeat of the idea as well. What destroyed fascism as an idea was not universal moral revulsion against it, since plenty of people were willing to endorse the idea as long as it seemed the wave of the future, but its lack of success. After the war, it seemed to most people that German fascism as well as its other European and Asian variants were bound to self-destruct. There was no material reason why new fascist movements could not have sprung up again after the war in other locales, but for the fact that expansionist ultranationalism, with its promise of unending conflict leading to disastrous military defeat, had completely lost its appeal. The ruins of the Reich chancellery as well as the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed this ideology on the level of consciousness as well as materially, and all of the pro-fascist movements spawned by the German and Japanese examples like the Peronist movement in Argentina or Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian National Army withered after the war.

The ideological challenge mounted by the other great alternative to liberalism, communism, was far more serious. Marx, speaking Hegel's language, asserted that liberal society contained a fundamental contradiction that could not be resolved within its context, that between capital and labor, and this contradiction has constituted the chief accusation against liberalism ever since. But surely, the class issue has actually been successfully resolved in the West. As Kojève (among others) noted, the egalitarianism of modern America represents the essential achievement of the classless society envisioned by Marx. This is not to say that there are not rich people and poor people in the United States, or that the gap between them has not grown in recent years. But the root causes of economic inequality do not have to do with the underlying legal and social structure of our society, which remains fundamentally egalitarian and moderately redistributionist, so much as with the cultural and social characteristics of the groups that make it up, which are in turn the historical legacy of premodern conditions. Thus black poverty in the United States is not the inherent product of liberalism, but is rather the »legacy of slavery and racism« which persisted long after the formal abolition of slavery.

As a result of the receding of the class issue, the appeal of communism in the developed Western world, it is safe to say, is lower today than any time since the end of the First World War. This can he measured in any number of ways: in the declining membership and electoral pull of the major European communist parties, and their overtly revisionist programs; in the corresponding electoral success of conservative parties from Britain and Germany to the United States and Japan, which are unabashedly pro-market and anti-statist; and in an intellectual climate whose most »advanced« members no longer believe that bourgeois society is something that ultimately needs to be overcome. This is not to say that the opinions of progressive intellectuals in Western countries are not deeply pathological in any number of ways. But those who believe that the future must inevitably be socialist tend to be very old, or very marginal to the real political discourse of their societies.

ONE MAY argue that the socialist alternative was never terribly plausible for the North Atlantic world, and was sustained for the last several decades primarily by its success outside of this region. But it is precisely in the non-European world that one is most struck by the occurrence of major ideological transformations. Surely the most remarkable changes have occurred in Asia. Due to the strength and adaptability of the indigenous cultures there, Asia became a battleground for a variety of imported Western ideologies early in this century. Liberalism in Asia was a very weak reed in the period after World War I; it is easy today to forget how gloomy Asia's political future looked as recently as ten or fifteen years ago. It is easy to forget as well how momentous the outcome of Asian ideological struggles seemed for world political development as a whole.

The first Asian alternative to liberalism to be decisively defeated was the fascist one represented by Imperial Japan. Japanese fascism (like its German version) was defeated by the force of American arms in the Pacific war, and liberal democracy was imposed on Japan by a victorious United States. Western capitalism and political liberalism when transplanted to Japan were adapted and transformed by the Japanese in such a way as to be scarcely recognizable. Many Americans are now aware that Japanese industrial organization is very different from that prevailing in the United States or Europe, and it is questionable what relationship the factional maneuvering that takes place with the governing Liberal Democratic Party bears to democracy. Nonetheless, the very fact that the essential elements of economic and political liberalism have been so successfully grafted onto uniquely Japanese traditions and institutions guarantees their survival in the long run. More important is the contribution that Japan has made in turn to world history by following in the footsteps of the United States to create a truly universal consumer culture that has become both a symbol and an underpinning of the universal homogenous state. V.S. Naipaul traveling in Khomeini's Iran shortly after the revolution noted the omnipresent signs advertising the products of Sony, Hitachi, and JVC, whose appeal remained virtually irresistible and gave the lie to the regime's pretensions of restoring a state based on the rule of the Shariah. Desire for access to the consumer culture, created in large measure by Japan, has played a crucial role in fostering the spread of economic liberalism throughout Asia, and hence in promoting political liberalism as well.

The economic success of the other newly industrializing countries (NICs) in Asia following on the example of Japan is by now a familiar story. What is important from a Hegelian standpoint is that political liberalism has been following economic liberalism, more slowly than many had hoped but with seeming inevitability. Here again we see the victory of the idea of the universal homogenous state. South Korea had developed into a modern, urbanized society with an increasingly large and well-educated middle class that could not possibly be isolated from the larger democratic trends around them. Under these circumstances it seemed intolerable to a large part of this population that it should be ruled by an anachronistic military regime while Japan, only a decade or so ahead in economic terms, had parliamentary institutions for over forty years. Even the former socialist regime in Burma, which for so many decades existed in dismal isolation from the larger trends dominating Asia, was buffeted in the past year by pressures to liberalize both its economy and political system. It is said that unhappiness with strongman Ne Win began when a senior Burmese officer went to Singapore for medical treatment and broke down crying when he saw how far socialist Burma had been left behind by its ASEAN neighbors.“ - Francis Fukuyama, 1989, The National Interest. **

1420

Excerpts from Samuel P. Huntington's „Clash of Civilizations“ (**):

„World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be - the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years.

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. ....

With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history.

On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among Non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and »Asianization« in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the »Hinduization« of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence »Re-Islamization« of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris Yeltsin's country. A West at the peak of its power confronts Non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in Non-Western ways.

The west is now at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations. ....“ - Samuel P. Huntington, 1993, The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs. **

 

NACH OBEN 495) Arminius, 23.06.2014, 11:33, 20:25 (1421-1422)

1421

There is a bifocal perspective, if we talk about „replacement“:

1.) B replaces A not bit by bit (B instead of A, but not bit by bit). The two bodies remain separately, and one of them replaces the other as a whole.
2.) B replaces A bit by bit, and in the end A is B or reamains A as a B.

I consider all possibilities in this thread.

1422


Obe wrote:

„In any case, as this bit by bit exchange occurs, if A is changed into B, but A is kept as the model, or not, after a duration of X time, the fact is A will = B.“ **

(1) In one case there are two different bodies: (1,1) machine, (1,2) human being. The machine does not become an android, and the human being does not become a cyborg, They bodily have nothing to do with each other. So they remain what they are. But someday one of them is completely replaced by the other, for example in this way: the last human being dies without any offspring and becomes replaced by the machine. The processes occur outside of the human body, not inside of the human body (as in case 2).

(2) In the other case a or the last human being is replaced little by little, bit by bit. So the human being becomes a cyborg. The machine may become an android but never become the human being. The human being may become a cyborg but never become a machine. So replacement has to happen. In this case an android (thus: machine) replaces a cyborg (thus: human being). The processes occur inside of the human body, not outside of the human body (as in case 1).

So the processes are very differerent, although the results are alike or even equal. In the first case (1) the bodiies remain the same until complete replacement, and in the second case (2) one body does not remain the same because it becomes replaced little by little, bit by bit. In the first case the processes occur outside of the bodies, and in the second case (2) the processes occur inside of the human body.

 

NACH OBEN 496) Arminius, 25.06.2014, 02:03 (1423)

1423

James S. Saint wrote:

„Obe wrote:

»I would like to pre-empt a foreseeable objection about the conceivability of creation,termination. In the beginning...the commercial development, marketing, and sales of such 'products' will be exceedingly high. As capitalistic supply and demand curves begin to slope into more affordable areas, the usual development and sales figures will jump significantly. The previous super wealthy, will, use life extension, also on a progressive scale, to justify their bit by bit conversion, until they do not recognize, that ultimately, their most private parts will also need to be replaced. By this time, the costs will be enormous, but as with all newly created products, it will again become more reasonable, as other wealthy, as usually, loose their fortunes, and cheaper products will need to be developed to deal with the newly emerging markets of those with the need for these types of products, but with affordability issues. By these times the creators may instill a program requirement of non recognition, or the purchasers may not recognize themselves.« **

First, »cost« is relative. By definition, the wealthy can afford the »cost«, else they aren't wealthy. And the less money they have, the less-wealthy have even less than that.

Second, when the wealthy want something, they use machines to make it less costly, even if it is more machines they want. And they use the confusion of remaining homosapians to make the machines actually negative-costly, profitable.

So the wealthy actually replace homosapians for free and in the end, no longer have to hide their criminality, as there is no one left to hide it from.“ **

Yes, but the rich (powerful) risk that they will also be replaced by machines. The greatest human megalomania of all time.

 

NACH OBEN 497) Arminius, 29.06.2014, 13:13, 13:49, 13:58, 14:50, 15:02 (1424-1428)

1424

Contra-Nietzsche or Contra-Diction or whoever you are, please try to read the thread and try to notice that the topic of my thread is a QUESTION (**|**).

Quitting again, Contra-Diction? **

This thread is no thread for frustrated warriors!

1425

No, „Contra-Nietzsche“ (Contra-Diction). You have absolutely no idea!

Contra-Nietzsche wrote:

„Im am three things, 1) A Catholic 2) A Cynic 3) A Machiavellian.“ **

No, you are NOT three things. You are merely ONE thing: a frustrated warrior, i.e. a loser!

This frustrated warrior (loser) is not a „Contra-Nietzsche“, but a Contra-Diction. „Contra-Nietzsche“ is a 67%-Nietzschean. So his true name is more (67%) Contra-Diction than „Contra-Nietzsche“.

You are also and especially frustrated because YOUR „nation“ has no success. Stop looking for scapegoats, Contra-Diction!

Zinnat wrote:

„CN,

You are certainly the strangest person that i ever came across on the net, for the simple reason that i have not seen any person yet who does not know what he is saying and why also.“ **

Please quitt again, Contra-Diction!

Laughing Man wrote:

„I'm deeply saddened by your leaving Contra. I will light a candle in your remembrance.“ **

1426

Contra-Nietzsche wrote:

„Quitting again.“ **

Hooray, would you please sign it, Contra-Diction?

Of course, I am also deeply saddened by your leaving and will light a candle in your remembrance, Contra-Diction.

Bye, Contra-Diction!

1427

James, you are saying that „existence is that which has affect“ (**), and that in „reality, people are already using the word »exist« to mean this definition. They often never think about it, but in every case, the person really means that something having existence means that it has the potential to affect something; be seen, touched, smelled, or detected in some way even if not already detected.“ (**). But one can doubt that „the person really means that something having existence means that it has the potential to affect something; be seen, touched, smelled, or detected in some way even if not already detected“ (**), as you probably know. We just have to know more about the term „having affect“.

1428

Obe wrote:

„I remember a guy a few years back ran for president on this platform. he didn't make it to the primaries, in a long shot.

Cant even remember his name, and have had absolutely no luck in finding him in any source. He did predict economic disaster, in addition to using the »Clash of Civilizations« as his basic antidote against Reagan's »New World Order« proclamation. So it must have been in the eighties.“ **

No, in the 1990’s, because it was after the end of the so-called „Cold War“ when George Herbert Walker Bush proclaimed the so called „New World Order“.

 

NACH OBEN 498) Arminius, 30.06.2014, 01:28, 02:58, 12:02, 14:01, 16:20, 17:32, 18:07, 19:17 (1429-1436)

1429

Mags J. wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»Okay. Mags’ award would have been this one:

Http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJFthHp3aI8.

Or this one:

Http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2cynRI7-5Lc.

Or this one:

Http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tqbENFMqsWE.

The decision would have been difficult!

Http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_30TFsAeoRBI/TEECBiX2feI/AAAAAAAAAAM/6FA81z1WxJg/s320/magsmusicblack.jpg.

Instead of flowers?« ** **

So Fuse gets flowers and I get an award.

I never get flowers.

Thanks though.“ **

Excuse me, but the first award must be different from the second award, and Fuse gets the first award and you get the second award (**|**).

I had expected you to win the 1st prize and the flowers already in my left hand, but then Fuse came and won quickly.

Good luck for the next contest, Mags!

1430

James S. Saint wrote:

„Can you think of anything that you believe to exist and yet also believe has absolutely no affect upon anything?“ **

Yes, I can think in that way. The „potential to affect something“ and the fact to „be seen, touched, smelled, or detected in some way even if not already detected“ are perhaps not the same thing or, if they are the same thing, perceived differently because there are - for example - different observers, and there is the problem of the subject/object dualism. ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **

„By declared definition, existence is that which has affect.“ (**). You are saying that existence is that which has affect. But do all people really use the words „exist“ and „existence“ as you use them? And if so, what or who ist the one which or who affects what or whom? What or who is the first one? Does an „affectless affect“ exist? Is this so called „affectless affect“ similar to the so called „unmoved mover“?

James S. Saint wrote:

„In RM:AO, it is merely a declared definition for what it means to physically exist, within the ontology. But in reality, I haven't found anything that didn't fit that definition anyway. But if someone wants to declare the existence of something that also has no affect upon anything, they are free to do so. They just can't declare it in RM:AO.“ **

Different cultures/civilisations interpret or even construe the reality in a different way than other cultures/civilisations.

Does nothingness or nonentity have any affect? What about the „nirvana“? What do you think about the „nirvana“? And probably in contrast: what does Zinnat think about the „nirvana“? What do you think about Zinnat's thinking about the „nirvana“? .... And so on ....

1431

Mithus wrote:

„Arminius, I'm trying to understand you.

Arminius wrote:

»James S. Saint wrote:

›Can you think of anything that you believe to exist and yet also believe has absolutely no affect upon anything?‹ **

Yes, I can think in that way ....« ** **

Could you give one example for that?

If I understand you right, you mean the following: When people say that something exists, they mean, that they have the active part by perceiving that what exists with their senses. After James' ontology, waves of affectance come from the objects to affect them (the people), so that they can perceive the objects (that what exists). In that case the »active part« comes- first- from the objects. Is that right?
If yes, why is it relevant for you who or what affects first whom or what?
Or, in other words, does s.th. exist because I see it or because it can be seen by me?
I think in commom usage of the word »exist« people don't really see a difference in that.“ **

Many people don't think very much, but if (if!) they really think that something exists, they do it in two different ways: (1) subjectively, so they think existence has merely to do with the thinking subject, and (2) objectively, so they think existence is something which has nothing to do with the thinking subject. Merely the second way is also the way to think that „waves of affectance come from the objects to affect“. If they think they „can perceive the objects“, they actually have to ask themselves, whether that objects „exist“ without any subject or because of the „existence“ of the perceiving subject, so that objects don't „exist“. I am speaking about the subject/object dualism. Is subjectivity or objectivity that what we call „reality“ or is it both, so that there is no solution for the subject/object dualism?

1432

Mithus wrote:

„Still I would like to have an example for s.th. what you believe that exist but doesn't affect you or anything at all, because I cannot think this way.

If you think that all around you - everything except you - merely „exists“ because of the fact that you are perceiving and thinking, then you can also say that there is nothing that „exists“ except you, so you are either merely a subject without any object or both subject and object (or even: there is no subject and no object - because there is no difference between them).

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz once asked:
Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?
(„Why is there anything [being] at all rather than nothing[ness]?“)
(„Seiendes“ is derived from „sein“ [„to be“] and means an identical mode of „being“.)
Do you know the answer?

Or think about the Indian culture/civilisation - the so called „Hinduism“ (b.t.w.: I think it is more than merely „Hinduism“) - and its concept of „nirvana“. Do you exactly know what is meant by that? Non-Indian and Indian people have a different understanding of „nirvana“. Is it nothingness, nonentity? (That is the way how Western people understand „nirvana“.) What is it?

Are „affectance“ and nothingness perhaps the same? And if so: why? Just because we are able to think the nothingness? Or is the reverse true?

If there is nothing, then there is also no „affectance“. If there is no „affectance“, then there is nothing. The former is true! But is the latter also true?

And do you always think that there is „affectance“ everywhere and nothing else? Do you really always think that?

What do you think when you are anxious and don't know the reason - the cause - for that fact? What or who „affects“ you then? Is it the nothingness? And if so, then the nothingness also „affects“, but is it then really nothingness?

We can think the nothingness and the difference between subject and object. Is this difference the nothingness? Or is it even the „affectance“? Or both? Are they the same (see above) or at least similar? If so, then we can't know anything of them because it is the definition - the linguistic convention or the lingusitic laws - of the word „nothing“ to be nothing at all, and the noun for that is „nothingness“.

You can't just brush aside our ability for thinking the nothingness and the subject/object dualism. (**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**|**).

So James’ „RM:AO“ has an objective character; the terms „rational metaphysics“ and „affectance ontology“ claim to be objective, and they are objective. But what about James himself? Is he a part of that objective issue? Is he not present when he argues objectively? And what about the nothingness?

1433

James S. Saint wrote:

„Can you give an example of something that exists, yet has absolutely no affect on anything? Name something for me.“ **

Yes I can, provided that you agree to my thesis that our thoughts exist and especially the nothingness exists as well - exists without „having affect« of course -, but I know that you don't agree to that thesis because you are saying that „exist“ means „having affect“, so that „existence“ is „affectance“. Would you agree to the thesis, that other people don't agree to your definition of „existence“ as „affectance“?

Nothingness has no affect, else it would be no nothingness. And if nothingness were no nothingness, then we would have to find another word for nothingness, and we soon would have find one because we can think nothingness. Nothingness has no affect, but exists, at least in our thoughts, and our thoughts exist as well. That all depends on the definition, so your definition has to be a different one - and is a different one (I know) -, but if your definition is right, then you have to exclude nothingness from your definition of „existence“.

James S. Saint wrote:

„So do you believe that a box only exists when it is being observed?“ **

I don't believe that, but I also don't deny that it is possible. If someone believes that, I would not say that it is absolutely wrong to believe that. Remember that we are philophising, and the philosophy has not resolved the problem of the subject/object dualism. The science can't resolve it anyway, and I think the philosophy probably neither.

Don't get me wrong because I don't think that your ontology is false, but you have to admit that it depends on your definition of „existence“.

James S. Saint wrote:

„A »declared definition« means that in this ontology (RM:AO), the word is going to mean what it is defined as. Other people can use that same word in many other ways. But in RM:AO, any time the word »exist« is used, it means »having affect«.“ **

Yes, like I said.

James S. Saint wrote:

„Which came first and which affects which, are separate details from the issue of what it means to exist within the ontology.“ **

Does God exist? Does the unmoved mover exist? Does the unaffected affect exist?

James S. Saint wrote:

„»Absolute nothingness« is the »lack of affect«.“ **

It is possible that the nothingness is God, or the unmoved mover, or the unaffected affect!

1434

James S. Saint wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz once asked:
Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?
(„Why is there anything [being] at all rather than nothing[ness]?“)
(„Seiendes“ is derived from „sein“ [„to be“] and means an identical mode of „being“.)
Do you know the answer? ** **

Yes.
It is mathematically impossible for absolute zero affect to be a state or condition at any time, in any place.“ **

The question was not meant mathematically. Leibniz, the founder of the infinitesimal calculus and e.g. of the first calculating machine, was one of the greatest mathematician (the greatest: Carl Friedrich Gauß ), technician, and philosopher, so his question was not meant mathematically, but philospophically, theologically.

James S. Saint wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»Are ›affectance‹ and nothingness perhaps the same?« ** **

They are exact opposite. Affectance is the lack of nothingness and Nothingness is the lack of affectance.“ **

James, I know your „RM:AO“, thus I also know that according to RM:AO „affectance“ and nothingness are exact the opposite. So my questions are not always questions of understanding „RM:AO“.

James S. Saint wrote:

„The thought of nothingness, is not nothingness.“ **

I never said that the thought of nothingness is nothingness.

James S. Saint wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»We can think the nothingness and the difference between subject and object. Is this difference the nothingness? Or is it even the ›affectance‹? Or both? Are they the same (see above) or at least similar?« ** **

I don't understand what is being asked.“ **

There is an unknown or undefined difference and there is an unknown or undefined nothingness. If we don't know much about the difference and about the nothingness, then one can ask whether they are the same or not.

James S. Saint wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»So James' ›RM:AO‹ has an objective character; the terms "rational metaphysics" and "affectance ontology" claim to be objective, and they are objective. But what about James himself? Is he a part of that objective issue? Is he not present when he argues objectively? And what about the nothingness?« ** **

Again, what is the relevance? Define »objective« and you have your answer.
RM:AO doesn't bother with declaring »objective« versus »subjective«. It's not relevant until someone gets confused. And frankly, it is a bit like asking if »RM:AO« is red, blue, or is it colorless? And if it is colorless, how can we see it or know that it exists?“ **

No. You and your ontology are not the same. Defining „objective“ is not enough.

1435

Mithus wrote:

„Can you really think of nothingness? Even the thought of nothingness requires an imagination of nothingness. Is it black, bright, colourless? Doesn't it have to be limited by "something". Can you have a thought without an imagination how it looks, smells, tastes, feels ...? And as soon as you have an imagination, it affects you, it is not nothing anymore. Nothingness is just a word.
Could I have another example?“ **

Nothingness is not just a word. What about God? Is he just a word? What about something like an unmoved mover or an unaffected affect?

Even if „RM:AO“ would be able to explain everything objectively, remains a rest.

1436

James S. Saint wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»Nothingness has no affect, but exists ....« ** **

No. It doesn't exist.“ **

Does God exist? Does the unmoved mover exist? Does an unaffected affect exist?

James S. Saint wrote:

„This is an issue of the ontology called »Solipsism«, not RM:AO.“ **

Yes, and ...?

James S. Saint wrote:

„Every understanding (ontology) depends on its definition of existence. You can't have an ontology without its definition of existence. It wouldn't be an ontology without one.“ **

That was not what I was saying. I was saying that YOUR ontology depends on YOUR definition of „existence“. The accent is on the word „your“.

James S. Saint wrote:

„Define »God«.
The »unmoved mover« is a situation that does not change yet causes change. Specifically, it is the situation of an affect attempting to reach infinity. Or it can be said to the a fact, specifically, the fact that infinity cannot be reached. In either case, situation or fact, the propagation of an affect changes because of it.“ **

God is the first cause, the primary cause, the cause of all reality, of all existence.

The unmoved mover causes change.

 

NACH OBEN 499) Arminius, 01.07.2014, 15:49, 16:17, 16:32 (1437-1439)

1437

James S. Saint wrote:

„You don't need RM:AO to know that affectance is the opposite of nothingness, or perhaps better said as »the lack of nothingness«.“ **

Yes, I know, but I am just philosophising.

Mithus wrote:

„@ Arminius

»NOTHINGNESS«

Farlex Free Dictionary: »The condition or quality of being nothing; nonexistence.«

Merriam-Webster: »The quality or state of being nothing, as
a) NONEXISTENCE
b) utter insignificance
c) Death«

Oxford Dictionary: »The absence or cessation of life or existence

Dictionary.com: a) the state of being nothing
b) something that is nonexistent
c) lack of being, nonexistence«

That is also well known to me. But „nothingness“ is a word with a various definition or concept, so it is worth to philosophise, and I am just philosophising here in this forum, which is an philosophy forum; else I would not doubt the „mainstream“ meaning of - for example - the „time arrow“, the „big bang“, the „inflation of the universe“, or also the „nothingness“.

1438

H. G. Wells was inaugurated.

1439

James S. Saint wrote:

„Roughly around 1350 AD, Satan was released from his bonds to be granted a 1000 year reign that we are currently experiencing, just as predicted. So around 2350 AD, the game would be over.“ **

Roughly around 1350 AD the pest began.

 

NACH OBEN 500) Arminius, 03.07.2014, 01:09, 01:36, 02:54, 03:13, 14:34, 15:27, 22:51, 23:00, 23:20, 23:57 (1440-1449)

1440

James S. Saint wrote:

„So my question now is whether you agree that »nothingness« doesn't exist, by definition. And more importantly to me, why it could never be the state of the universe (Metaphysics is all about the »Why?« question)?“ **

According to your ontology I agree „that »nothingness« doesn't exist, by definition“ and that „it could never be the state of the universe“. But I reserve the right, that there are other definitions and possibilities.

1441

Back to modern times:

What do you think about Luddism, Neo-Luddism, and Neo-Neo-Luddism?

Named after Ned Ludd, a youth who allegedly smashed two stocking frames in 1779, and whose name had become emblematic of machine destroyers. Ned Ludd was allegedly called General Ludd or King Ludd, a figure who, like Robin Hood, was reputed to live in Sherwood Forest.

**   **

1442

„An affect can only derive from the potential-to-affect (to alter or to change), PtA, of another separate or distinguished affect.“ **

An affect with a potential-to-affect - that's tautological. You couldn't find another word for „affect“, could you?

1443

James S. Saint wrote:

„So to what degree are people »free«? And which people?“ **

People can merely be relatively free, like I said a number of times. Even the most powerful people are merely relatively free. However, there is a great difference between relative freedom of the most powerful people and relative freedom of the most powerless people.

1444

Monad wrote:

„Natural observations even during the time of Volta are not defined by metaphysics. If a volt had to be metaphysically defined as compared to simply not being understood what caused it we still wouldn't know what it is.

What this implies is that anything not understood scientifically must be metaphysically defined in philosophy ... a non sequitur. Newton wrote the Laws of Gravity but had no idea what made it work. He did not proceed to define this gap metaphysically if he could not explain it scientifically. Instead »his philosophy« on the subject of not knowing was Hypotheses non fingo whereas your described methodology would give it a metaphysical resolution.

To repeat, Ohm and Lorentz were scientists not philosophers. They proceeded by theory combined with experimentation. This is not within the purview of philosophy and almost certainly philosophy was not on their chalk board when writing down the math.

Galileo, Kepler and Newton were the true beginnings of science. That was the point of no return. In your context of applying metaphysics to science, Kepler was an outstanding case. He was addicted to the idea of the five Platonic solids in describing planetary orbits. But this Platonic perfection didn't correspond to observation. Instead he had to completely rearrange the math and forgo the philosophy of perfection into something more elliptical. In short, he had to renounce metaphysics regardless of how perfect it seemed to describe the actual movements of planets around a centre. This wasn't easy for him being much more influenced by philosophy than either Galileo or Newton.

Philosophy »no-longer« decides anything relating to science. Though it may have created it, philosophy can no longer expound it. The kids, the grand kids and the great great grand kids moved on to become more genetically remote defined by their own specific objectives. As once with religion when priests were the intermediaries to God so with philosophy when method, the scientific kind, came into being the core principle of which is if you really want to understand something you have to yield to it and NOT to your preconceptions which philosophy then as now - though not quite to the same extent - is subject to.“ **

James S. Saint wrote:

„Monad wrote:

»Natural observations even during the time of Volta are not defined by metaphysics.« **

A naive statement, and false.

Monad wrote:

»If a volt had to be metaphysically defined as compared to simply not being understood what caused it we still wouldn't know what it is.« **

And people like yourself and also scientists do not.
It takes a metaphysicist, much like myself, to actually understand what it is.

Monad wrote:

»What this implies is that anything not understood scientifically must be metaphysically defined in philosophy ... a non sequitur.« **

No. What it implies is that until something is philosophically defined, you can't measure it. How can you measure it or even make any claim about it at all, if you don't even know what it is?

Monad wrote:

»Newton wrote the Laws of Gravity but had no idea what made it work. He did not proceed to define this gap metaphysically if he could not explain it scientifically.« **

He made no attempt to »explain it »scientifically«. He took and older idea (for which he was sued for stealing) and applied measurements to it. His claim for the »laws« (later to be found flawed) were all about »how much«, not about »what«. He didn't even come up with the names involved like »gravity«. He merely measured the effects, giving them consistency in numbers, quantified and thus much more usable. The theory prior to that time had been merely a rational explanation concerning a magical »force«, but with no way to be more certain, no way to verify the theory of »gravitational force«.

In reality, there actually is no such »force«, but that is something scientists are simply not qualified to consider. They don't know what they are measuring. They simply know that they can consistently predict an effect and it is called «gravity«. They have no idea at all as to what is really happening that makes it work. They will tell you that themselves.

Monad wrote:

»Instead ›his philosophy‹ on the subject of not knowing was Hypotheses non fingo whereas your described methodology would give it a metaphysical resolution.« **

That is what I just said.

Monad wrote:

»To repeat, Ohm and Lorentz were scientists not philosophers.« **

To repeat, they were »natural philosophers« who helped to begin the confirmation philosophy of falsification, or »Scientific Methodology«.

Monad wrote:

»They proceeded by theory combined with experimentation. This is not within the purview of philosophy and almost certainly philosophy was not on their chalk board when writing down the math.« **

Math is merely another example of philosophical thought being applied to quantities. Like myself, they were »polymaths«.

Monad wrote:

»Galileo, Kepler and Newton were the true beginnings of science. That was the point of no return. In your context of applying metaphysics to science, Kepler was an outstanding case. He was addicted to the idea of the five Platonic solids in describing planetary orbits. But this Platonic perfection didn't correspond to observation. Instead he had to completely rearrange the math and forgo the philosophy of perfection into something more elliptical. In short, he had to renounce metaphysics regardless of how perfect it seemed to describe the actual movements of planets around a centre. This wasn't easy for him being much more influenced by philosophy than either Galileo or Newton.« **

Your argument is that because Plato didn't get it perfect, it doesn't count?
I'm afraid that would disqualify ALL »scientists« to date, whether natural philosophers or not.

Monad wrote:

»Philosophy ›no-longer‹ decides anything relating to science. Though it may have created it, philosophy can no longer expound it.« **

I have found that such isn't true with the exception that »science« has become a egocentric religion now, and thus doesn't allow anything that embarrasses it. Science is in desperate need for philosophical update by a real metaphysicist rather than their amateur pseudo-science fantasizers (such as Higgs or Feynman).

Monad wrote:

»The kids, the grand kids and the great great grand kids moved on to become more genetically remote defined by their own specific objectives. As once with religion when priests were the intermediaries to God so with philosophy when method, the scientific kind, came into being the core principle of which is if you really want to understand something you have to yield to it and NOT to your preconceptions which philosophy then as now - though not quite to the same extent - is subject to.« **

Consider taking your own advice. I see you as the one exercising preconceived superficial notions.“ **

According to the question whether it is more science or more philosophy, you both are right, because it depends on the linguistics, especially on the semantics of both words. In former times it was the linguistic convention to Interpret many phenomenons more scientifically than philosophically, in former times, for example in the ancient Greece, it was the linguistic convention to interpret many phenomenons philosophically. The conclusion is: You have to come to an agreement when it comes to define and value the words »philosophy« and »science«.

In modern times of the Western culture the word »philosophy« has not as much good reputation as the word »science« (and as in pre-modern times of the Western culture); so we have to consider this as well when it comes to define and value the words »philosophy« and «science«.

Currently most people are wrong when they say this or that is more scientifical than philosophical - because of the fact that the word »science« is more »chic« and the word »philosophy« is more »antiquated«. That’s the linguistic convention - fortunately or unfortunately.

1445

James S. Saint wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»›An affect can only derive from the potential-to-affect (to alter or to change), PtA, of another separate or distinguished affect.‹

An affect with a potential-to-affect - that's tautological. You couldn't find another word for »affect«, could you?« ** **

Not »an affect with a potential to affect«. A potential-to-Affect is a situation or circumstance, not a »thing«.“ **

But an affect does have this potential, doesn't it?

James S. Saint wrote:

„And an »affect«, is an occurrence of potentials changing, or situations changing. An affect is a changing.“ **

So again: What or who can have an affect? Your answer: All what exists. The potential-to-affect and the affect itself must belong to »being«.

James S. Saint wrote:

„The potential that brings an affect is the situation of all surrounding affects. Every affect, affects its own surroundings as it is simultaneously affected by those surroundings. It is a give-and-take occurrence. Thus the »surroundings« constitute the «potential-to-affect«, PtA. And the »affect« is the result of the PtA.“ **

Okay. So you are saying that there is a situation which brings an affect as a situation of all surrounding affects - but what or who is the first affect? Your answer: That's not relevant. Okay, maybe it is God, the unmoved mover, the unaffected affect, or whatever .... According to that what you are saying it is just a situation, a potential.

James S. Saint wrote:

„And yes, I could have said, »energy« or »electromagnetic wave« or several other things, all of which would have inferred connotations left over from prior presumptions. So I chose a new word that actually says exactly what it means, »Affectance«.“ **

That's plausible.

1446

James S. Saint wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»But an affect does have this potential, doesn't it?« ** **

Well as you said, yes, but tautological (**|**).“ **

Okay.

James S. Saint wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»So again: What or who can have an affect? Your answer: All what exists. The potential-to-affect and the affect itself must belong to ›being‹.« ** **

Yes, »being« merely means »existing« which means »affecting«.“ **

Okay.

James S. Saint wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»Okay. So you are saying that there is a situation which brings an affect as a situation of all surrounding affects - but what or who is the first affect? Your answer: That's not relevant.« ** **

There was no »first in time«. There is a »first in principle« or »most fundamental« or »Primary Principle« or »Eternal Situation«, all of which are called »First Cause«, which is a »Situation of Affects«, which is a »Potential-to-Affect«. Time itself can have no beginning. It is impossible that the universe ever began. The universe has always been and must always be because the cause of it is eternal and must always be.“ **

According to your ontology it has to be, yes. It is nearly unimaginable, isn't it?

James S. Saint wrote:

„Arminius wrote:

»Okay, maybe it is God, the unmoved mover, the unaffected affect, or whatever .... According to that what you are saying it is just a situation, a potential.« ** **

In more detail, the ›unmoved mover‹ is the logical situation of a »PtA changing at an infinite rate, an infinite number of times, over an infinite distance and thus yielding a finite propagation of affect« (known as the »speed of light«) and is the cause of light. Or Biblically, »God said, Let there be light« or »God spoke and there was light« or »Due to God, there was light«. All of which are technically accurate considering the metaphorical »speaking«. And in a manner of speaking, »Yahweh« is »Affectance«, the »Spirit of God« (the Pathos) formed from the Unmoved Mover (The Logos) of »The Logic of the Situation of an infinitely fast affect having to make an infinite number of changes, an infinite number of times, chaotically spreading«.

»God the Father«, is a logical situation. And the »First Son of God« is the propagation and spreading of light. The abundance of such subtle chaotic affectance, light (»Yahweh«), still in the presence of the Father, demands »stagnation of the chaos« = Order = »Ahdam« = »The Manifestation of God«, known as »Matter« in physics and »Man« in scriptures. Socially, these same principles hold in that every order; particle, kingdom, or empire is formed for that exact same reason. The Bible is merely a different ontology and epistemology for the same reality. The »New World Order« is being formed by that same process.

And subsequently, the original Israel was to be the home of the social Yahweh and the RCC was/is a »Particle« wherein the Father stagnates the affectance/subtle chaos into an order (a »Stone«) while Yahweh permeates the surrounding ambience, »society«. Jesus, the impetus for order could not acquire mass and particlize within the home of Yahweh, for the same reason that a particle of matter cannot amass and remain stable within the extreme dense chaos of a black hole or star. A particle begins in such extreme chaotic and passionate ambience but must leave the region in order to become a stable order of mass. And then remains immutable with its acquired mass (assuming they do it right).

And that is the same reason that a sect of the original Mormon church left New York to go into the wilderness of Utah where it amassed into what is now the LDS, »The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints«.

The error that they make, and have always made, is the effort to form the entire world into a single particle, »Globalization«. Note that the universe is NOT one big particle of matter - For A Reason.“ **

Do you know Heraklit and his concept of „logos“ as the „eternal fire“?

1447

James S. Saint wrote:

„Something just occurred to me. Paganism is actually devolved philosophy and hedonism is the lack of philosophy.“ **

Why should paganism actually be „devolved philosophy“?

1448

James S. Saint wrote:

„Until people understand their own purpose in life and that of machines, there will always be discontent with the use of machines.

There is a »good« use for machines and there is a »bad« use for machines.

The good use involves the very impetus and needs of a life. If a machine is not increasing the Integral Sum of Joy, ISJ, in a society by its use, it should not be used. But the analysis of ISJ is very complex and far from being within the purview of the average person.

It is unethical to use machines for any other purpose, such as merely to gain money.

Yes, but money - thus: power (control, interest and so on) - is the purpose machines are used for.

Apropos money: we should have more than one currency, and the first one should be a currency of knowledge, wisdom, information.“ **

Yes, but money - thus: power (control, interest and so on) - is the purpose machines are used for.

Apropos money: we should have more than one currency, and the first one should be a currency of knowledge, wisdom, information.

1449

Come back, Laughing Man, Tyler Durden, James L. Walker, Tyrannus, Joker!

He is young, and he needs the money Anerkennung.

 

==>

 

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