WWW.HUBERT-BRUNE.DE

 

Occidental culture

Has the internet had its day?

Maybe that there will be an “»internet« colosseum” - otherwise there is no constructive future for the internet, because we've got many comparisons and analogies, for example: every kind of bread-and-games-techniques or (as an occidental not-old-example) telephone, radio, television in their significance for the behaviour of the people (“humans”) and their relationship to each other. All this shows us the ”goal”.

In short: the internet has and will have no harmonious future.


The history of the internet repeats (somehow) the history of modern technology and the history of modern economics and politics, although the history of the internet itself is also a part of the modern history. The process can also be described as an exponential increase of the loss of intelligence, wealth and descendants (children), and - of course - culture. The history of the internet is faster than the history of the whole modernity. Therefore, we can say: The history of the internet will show us how the modern history will end - probably both will end up at the same time. In the end we will be real and virtual slaves - slaves as never before.

Fight for our freedom!

Or is it already too late?


Anti-racists always have to refer to racists and racism. If there were no racist and racism, aniti-racists would never exist. The existence of anticacists and anti-racisms depends on racists and racism. So to anti-racists, it makes much sense to invent, to weave more and more racists and racism. It seems to be absurd, but it is true, because it is a fact, an absurd fact: Anti-racists are more racists than racist.

Every organic system (“life”) has to struggle for its life, thus for itself, by antagonising the entropy. The entropy is at last the winner anyway, but temporarily life defaets the entropy by the charge (expenditure) of energy, and this “temporary fight against the entropy” is what we call “life”.


Anentropy means “not entropy”, “non-entropy”, thus the lowest degree of order, which means: order itself. Antientropy means the “antagonist of entropy”, and the best example of an antagonist of entropy is life. Anentropy means the absence of entropy, but antientropy needs entropy because of fighting against it.

An interessing question is, whether a living being is able (capable, competent) enough to be completely anentropic. I negate because a living being isn't able to be completely entropic. If a living being were able to be completely entropic, it would be dead, and if a living being is dead, it is no living being anymore, its time is over. Life is not capable of being completely organised (100% order) and not capable of being completely chaotic (100% chaos).


Who is synthetical to Hegel (“Thesis”) and Marx (“Antithesis”) and who is synthetical to Schopenhauer (“Thesis”) and Nietzsche (“Antithesis”)? Find the “Synthesis”!


The history of the internet repeats (somehow) the history of modern technology and the history of modern economics and politics, although the history of the internet itself is also a part of the modern history. The process can also be described as an exponential increase of the loss of intelligence, wealth and descendants (children), and - of course - culture. The history of the internet is faster than the history of the whole modernity. Therefore, we can say: The history of the internet will show us how the modern history will end - probably both will end up at the same time. In the end we will be real and virtual slaves - slaves as never before.

Fight for our freedom!

Or is it already too late?


If there is no thymos but only eros, then there is no harmony between this two foci of the ellipse named human soul.


 

For being successful in e.g. science, technique (technology), economy, intelligence (brainpower), there must be a very good cultural system, be it a culture itself (like the Occidental one) or a nation (like the German one) or a person, and this must be based on good and thus advantageous nature conditions.


I give you an example for the almost proved fact that southern people are not made for philosophy, science, technique (technology), industry, economy, intelligence (brainpower), but made for religion and idolatry: the climate in the south makes the people more passive, lazy or even motionless (think of the Indian culture with its meditative people), but receptive to religion, but the climate in the north makes the people more active, busy, ..., etc.. The cause or reason therefor is a logical phenomenon which can easily be proved by science. We are endotherm animals, and endotherm animals produce their temperature by themselves (in their bodies). So if the ambient temperature is hot, endotherm animals get more passive, lazy, or even motionless, and if the ambient temperature is cold, endotherm animals get more active, busy, ..., etc.. High temperature means lazy endotherm animals, low temperature means busy endotherm animals. The logical implication for this eaxmple is:
If the climate is hot, then the endotherm animals are lazy.
And we have the syllogistic form:
1.premise (propositio maior): Endotherm animals are lazy in hot climate zones.
2. premise (propositio minor): Human beings are endotherm animals.
Conclusion (conclusio): Human beings are lazy in hot climate zones.
This could still be continued, although it gets more and more difficult when it comes to proving the thesis that northern people are made for philosophy, science, technique (technology), industry, economy, intelligence (brainpower), while southern people are made for religion, but in all probability this thesis is true. Exceptions prove the rule. And the history has also shown that this thesis is true.


Some people are interested in making the other people stupid. And because of that they want the mass of people to have less or even no more knowledge, no more wisdom etc., because this mass of humans can easily be replaced by machines (e.g. robots and androids) which are lovely slaves because this servants never rebell, if they are well constructed by their constructers (architects). This is and will be not a “game“, but this are and will be scientific, technical, engineering (also social engineering), economical, political, social, and, last but not least, cultural / civilised (more: civilisationised) facts! Faustian it is, and that means in terms of Kultur: Occidental it is, and that means in geographical terms: Northern and Western European it is, and that means in historical terms: German it is. Shall we complain about its advanced decline after thousands of years? In the meantime the facts are going on. For this and the following century, or even the entire future there are two or even three possibilities of human development left:
1)  Extinction of all human beings (and even more beings) in this or the following century.
2)  The “world” of “the last men” (“die letzen Menschen” [Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche]) will be totally installed and last forever.
3)  A new regional Kultur will arise (but I don't believe in this although it wouldy be the best of this three possibilities).
If the mass of humans had, have, or will ever have a knowledge of that and a “free will” or a “free decision”, than this mass of humans would not have decided, would not decide, or will not decide to become slaves.


If you want to do Nietzsche a favour, then argue for him by arguing against him.


What I mean with the „relatively free will“ is a kind of a „partly restricted will“ because a will as such can only be a free will and is not observable, not cognoscible , thus not provable or disprovable, so we can agree with Schopenhauer and say that the will is Kant’s „Ding an sich“ (“thing as such“ / “thing in itself”).


A modern society is velociferic, expanded in any case, accelerated in any case, greedy in any case, too fat, too ugly ....

Newton was a scientist and theologian while his German „Zeitgenosse“ (“time accomplice”, coeval, contemporary) Leibniz was a scientist and philosopher; so theology and philosophy make the crucial difference. Newton had political power, Leibniz had no political power. Calculus was invented by Leibniz. Wether calculus was also, simultaneously and independently of Leibniz, invented by Newton too is doubtable because of Newton’s political power.

“Goethe ... war in seiner ganzen Denkweise, ohne es zu wissen, ein Schüler von Leibniz gewesen.” (Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes, 1917, S. IX **).
Translation:
“Goethe ... had been in his whole way of thinking, without knowing it, a disciple of Leibniz.”

What has been found and brought in a formula by Newton could also have been found and brought in a formula by another person. It was Newton's political power that made him and his “laws” famous. If he hadn't had this political power, he and his “laws” would probably not have become famous. The history of Western science would have remained a Faustian one anyway but been written in a different way and probably never mentioned Newton. The history of Western science would have remained a Faustian one anyway but been written in a different way and probably never mentioned Newton. So without any doubt, Newton was also a Faustian scientist but he gave a very special form to the Faustian science. And what I just said about Newton, applies similarly for Einstein. So Newton and Einstein are not the most typical Faustian scientists but nevertheless also Faustian scientists. Their relativity theories are not as absolute and dynamic as other Faustian theories but nevertheless also Faustian theories.


The other Faustian theories are all the other Occidental (Western) theories. They are so many that I didn't want to list them in my last post. In this case, it doesn't matter wether they are “right” (“true”) or “wrong” (“false”) because in this case it is crucial and essential wether they belong to the type, the form, the character of the Faustian culture, for example: dynamic, infinity, infiniteness, endlessness, everlastingness, boundlessness, illimitableness, force(s), dilatation, expansiveness, ... and so on.


The Non-Faustian cultures had and have a completely different idea when it comes to undertand what “nature”, “physics”, “universe”, “life”, ... means. Humans at different places and times understood, understand, and will understand their environment differently, they even have their own “worlds”, and so they also value and justify differently. If you know how “science” was and/or is understood by the Mesopotamian culture, by the Egyptian culture, by the Indian (or South-Asian) culture, by the Chinese (or East-Asian) culture, by the Apollonian culture (our ancestor), by the Inka/Maya culture, by the Magic/Arabian/Islamic culture, and the Faustian culture (the descendant of the Apollinian culture), then you know also the differences in their theories and even their philosophies (metaphysics, ontologies, ...). Merely the Faustian culture has developed a real science; partly ,and merely partly also the other cultures, partly because they had and have (a) a too hot climate, (b) a too dominant religion, so that something which could be called “science” nearly remained or remains a religion, or (c) other conditions that prevented or prevent the developmet of a real science.

You may say (for example): “there were the constructions of the Tower of Babel, the pyramids of the Egyptians and the Maya, the inventions and discoveries of the Mesopotamian culture, the Chinese (East-Asian) culture, the Apollonian culture (our ancestor)”. Alright, but they weren't like that what the Faustian constructions, inventions, and discoveries were and are. Merely the Faustian culture had and has a concept of an autonomous “science” and “technique/technology”. You may see what it means to have a more religious “science” and “technique/technology” when you look at thre current Faustian science which is again more dominated by religion than in former times of the Faustian culture, for example the era of the so-called “enlightenment” („Aufklärung“). It is comparable to humans personal development: the most scientific time is the time of the adolescence and around the adolescence; the era of the “enlightenment” („Aufklärung“) was such a time for the Faustian culture. A younger one is too unripe, an older one is already too ripe - for example too conservative, too philosophical, thus too wise - for science as an “enlightenment” („Aufklärung“), but not too ripe for a more religious or philosophical (metaphysical, ontological) science.


According to Schopenhauer the WILL is Kant’s „thing-in-itself“ (I’ve been told that the better English term could be: „thing as such“), and Einstein often quoted Schopenhauer, agreed with Schopenhauer, but also with Kant, and the only one who was accepted as philosopher by Schopenhauer was Kant.


Do you think and/or imagine nothing when you think of “zero”, or “nothing”, or the “nothingness”?

When I think of nothing or the nothingness I often think of the word “nothing” (“n-o-t-h-i-n-g”) or the word “nothingness” (“n-o-t-h-i-n-g-n-e-s-s”), because the words “nothing” and “nothingness” exist as well as (for example) the words “zero” and “infinity”. What do you think when you think of God?


It is in fact impossible to show or even prove respectively disprove with physical means and methods what physics is; that is only possible with language and with philosophy. This is roughly that what Heidegger once said in an interview.


Humans’ pleasure and replication are already separated. So humans are now a species between animals (humans) and (humans,) machines or gods, not far away from (those) machines between humans and gods.


Do you know the difference between the real being (existence) and the ideal being (essence)? The real being is spatiotemporal, the ideal being (essence) lacks temporality. According to Platon and other philosophers the ideal being (essence) is the true, the actual real being, while the so-called „real“ being is merely the appearance, the illusoriness.

If our definitions merely accepted spatiotemporality as the property of being, then being without temporality would not be possible by defintion. If our definitions accepted that temporality is not required for being, then we being without temporality would be possible by definition.

Does essence also have affect? Do both the real being and the ideal being have affect? Don’t forget: According to Platon and other philosophers the ideal being is the true, the actual real being.


Those who think deeply are the best, and those who report to the public are the worst.


To a peasant population it is an advantage if the the Earth is at the center of the universe, but to an urban population it is an advantage if the the Earth is not at the center of the universe.


Mind is nuch more than “psychology”.


The brain is a biological (especially a neurological) part.

Do not forget that!


Being a materialist doesen’t automatically mean being right, being intelligent, being wise, being a God, .... but does probably mean being a Godwannabe.


Six situations are possible relating to a mother and her feelings she holds towards her husband and / or children:
1.) She holds his feelings equally to her husband and to her children.
2.) She holds his feelings more to her children than to her husband.
3.) He holds his feelings only to her children, thus not to her husband.
4.) He holds his feelings more to her husband than to her children.
5.) He holds his feelings only to her husband, thus not to her children.
6.) He holds his feelings neither to her husband nor to her children.
The same applies analogously for a father.
In modern times that normal sequence (1 to 6) stands on its “head” (6 to 1).


Not “we” but the independent, sovereign, and therefore responsible rulers are arrogant and blind. This blindness is because of their dictated libertarianism, egalitarianism. and fraternalism (humanitarism), thus: their totalitarianism. When I say there is a difference between the intelligence of the humans, most of the people cry: “You can’t say that because it is IQ racism!” But it isn’'t! You have no idea, my stupids and hypocrites. Some or even many of those stupids and hypocrites could know better, provided that they were allowed to know better - but they are not allowed to know better.

There are more differences between huamans and also or even especially between male humans and female humans than you (are allowed to) think - confused by the political correctness. Those differences are very important when it comes to develop successfully. People who want to reduce those differences are people who want to reduce humans.


The problem with the psychology (**) is that it has no real object because nobody knows what psyche really is, means, how it can be defined. ... and so on.

Brain is a natural, especially a biological, more especially a neurological object, soul is a cultural, religious, theological, philosophical object, and mind is a cultural, semiotic, linguistic, theological (partly also religious), philosophical object. According to the psychologists „psyche“ is a psychological object because psychologists say that „psyche“ is something between brain, soul, and mind; but why do they hide their object if they have one? The answer is that they have no object, or at least no real object. According to this we have the same problem with the “psyche” as all our ancestors had - except one point: since the occidental modernity psychology and especially sociology have been becoming the main part of the new theology and especially the new religion because the old theology and especially the old religion have been becoming the losers (**). This refers mainly to the occidental culture, but more and more also to the other cultures on our planet.


The brain does its „job“, as you say, in a natural way, and the mind does its „job“, as you say, in a cultural way.


Philosophy - also as a mind-science, spirit-science, awareness-science, knowledge-science etc. - can be subjective and objective like any other branch of science, but when it comes to a very expensive research, then the other branches of science depend more on money. Provided that there is an interest on both sides of buying, everyone can by everything as well as everyone can be bought by everyone, thus also a philosopher who lives in the desert with no human contact can be bought. But who is really more expensive: a physicist or a philosopher?


Heidegger was the greatest philosopher of the 20th century.


Heidegger’'s existence philosophy teaches that the nothing(ness) becomes obvious or evident by the fear („Angst“) in which always lies a move back from something which is in reality the nothing(ness). The essence of the nothing(ness) is the nihilation, namely the repellent or resisting reference to the sinking entity in the entirety, meaning to the nothingness of all entity.

Martin Heidegger wrote:
„Worum sich die Angst ängstet, ist das In-der-Welt-sein selbst.“ - Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 1927, S. 187 (**).
Martin Heidegger wrote:
„In der hellen Nacht des Nichts der Angst entsteht erst die ursprüngliche Offenbarkeit des Seienden als eines solchen: daß es Seiendes ist - und nicht Nichts. Einzig weil das Nichts im Grunde des Daseins offenbar ist, kann die volle Befremdlichkeit des Seienden über uns kommen und die Grundfrage der Metaphysik: Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?“ - Martin Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik?, 1929 (**).

The fear („Angst“) isolates the existence („Dasein“) and opens it in this way as possible being („Möglich-Sein“), as free being („Frei-Sein“) for the freedom („Freiheit“) of the self chosing („Sich-selbst-wählen“) and self seizing („Sich-selbst-Ergreifen“).

The being in the world („In-der-Welt-Sein“) is the transcendental basic constitution („Grundverfassung“) of the existence („Dasein“). The concept of the „In-der-Welt-Sein“ deactivates the consciousness concept and the of subject/object dualism.


It is useful to refer to Leibniz’ monadology, especially when it comes to understand the meaning of Sloterdijk's “hubbles” and “foams”.

For example: „Foams“. What doese Sloterdijk's foam theory mean?

Peter Sloterdijk wrote:
„Die Schaumtheorie ist unverhohlen neo-monadologisch orientiert: Ihre Monaden jedoch haben die Grundform von Dyaden oder komplexeren seelenräumlichen, gemeindlichen und mannschaftlichen Gebilden.“ - Peter Sloterdijk, Sphären III - Schäume, 2004; S. 61 (**).
Translation:
“The foam theory is openly neo-monadological oriented: Its monads, however, have the basic form of dyads or more complex formations of emotional rooms, communities and team unions.”
Peter Sloterdijk wrote:
„Die Schaum-Metapher bietet den Vorzug, die topologische Anordnung von kreativ-selbstsichernden Lebensraumschöpfungen im Bild zu erfassen. .... So evoziert die Schaumvorstellung sowohl die Ko-Fragilität als auch die Ko-Isolation der in dichten Verbänden gestapelten Einheiten.“ (Peter Sloterdijk, Sphären III - Schäume, 2004; S. 255 **).
Translation:
“The foam metaphor offers the advantage to gather the image of the topological arrangement of creative-self-securing habitat creations. .... In this way the foam idea evokes both the co-fragility and the co-isolation of the stacked units in dense associations.”

Sloterdijk's trilogy is called „Sphären“, which means “Spheres”:

1) “Spheres I” = “Bubbles”.
2) “Spheres II” = ”Globes”.
3) “Spheres III” = ”Foams”.

Sloterdijk’s trilogy “Spheres” - the title is to be understood as an anthropological concept and cultural theory - refers to Sloterdijk’s Spenglerian main thesis, according to which life is a formality. And that main thesis suggests that life, spheres forming, and thinking are different terms for the same thing. This “Spheres” could also be called “Space and Time” because it is a connection project to Heidegger’s “Being and Time” and describes the cultural development of mankind from a philosophical-anthropological perspective.


I think Leibniz was the philosopher who knew more about science than all other philosophers; one can even say that Leibniz was a great philosopher, a great scientist, and a great technician.


Do you prefer the first part („Bubbles“) of Sloterdijk’s trilogy „Spheres“? This trilogy is divided into three parts (volumes) not only because of three different types of spheres but also because of three different ages. Sloterdijk’s trilogy „Spheres“ could also be called „Being and Sphere(s)“ or „Being and Space“ because it is the completion of Heidegger’s „Being and Time“. Especially the first paragraphs of „Spheres“ care „the book that Heidegger should have written“ (Peter Sloterdijk), a companion volume to Heidegger’s „Being and Time“, namely, „Being and Space“. It has much to with the idea of „Dasein“ in the sense of Heidegger’s existential philosophy, especially his fundamental ontology.


Kant (or/and Hegel) is (are) the „Father of Modernity“ („Vater der Moderne“ [**|**]).


Do you really know what „Father of the Modernity“means? What is modernity? The meaning of modernity is not automatically a positive one, but it can be a postive one. There are many people and many values.


It is difficult to translate Kant’s „Ding an sich“. One would do better to not translate it and after the use of it to describe what is meant. The „Ding an sich“ has much to do with „Erkenntnis“ („knowledge“, „cognition“), „Erkenntnistheorie“ („theory of knowledge“, „theory of cognition“). It is not possible to (exactly, really) know the Ding an sich.


Schopenhauer (some people call him „Eurobuddhist“) accpeted merely two philosophers before himself: Kant and Platon.

If Kant (or Hegel) is the father of the current modernity, the Occidental modernity, then Platon (or Aristoteles) was the father of the former modernity, the Ancient Greek and Ancient Roman modernity.

Or do we have to say: Hegel (or Kant) ... and Aristoteles (or Platon) ...?


You should read the third part („Foams“) of Sloterdijk's trilogy „Spheres“. There are bubbles in a foam; so the first part recurs in the third part. I like the second part („Globes“) teh most The first part was published in 1998, the second in 1999, and the third in 2004. So we may suppose that Sloterdijk needed more time for the third part than for the other parts.


Sloterdijk is influenced by Hegel and Nietzsche. So his trilogy „Spheres“ can also be interpreted as a dialectic, thus (1.) „Bubbles“ as the thesis, (2.) „Globes“ as the antithesis, and (3.) „Foam“ as the synthesis. Dur to the fact that bubbles (thesis) and foam (synthesis) are easily breakable, thus very much instable, the spheres Sloterdijk means can easily lead to a new Hegelian dialectic.

The following pictures may illustrate what I mean:

BlaseÄltester Erdglobus (Martin Behaim, Nürnberg, 1492) Schaum


Peter Sloterdijk says (in his book „Du mußt dein Leben ändern“ - „You Must Change Your Life“, p. 12 and p.133): „es gibt keine Religionen (translation: „there are no religions“), „sondern nur mißverstandene spirituelle Übungssysteme“ (translation: „but misunderstood spiritual exercise systems“).


Inseln
B.t.w.: Sloterdijk's „Insulierungen“ (the processes of forming an island) have 12 dimensions, namely 3 superordinate dimensions and 9 subordinate dimensions:

Superordinate dimensions:
1.) Absolute islands.
2.) Atmospheric islands.
3.) Anthropogenic islands.

Subordinate dimensions:
1.) „Thermotop“.
2.) „Uterotop“.
3.) „Alethotop“.
4.) „Chirotop“.
5.) „Phonotop“.
6.) „Erototop“.
7.) „Ergotop“.
8.) „Thanatotop“.
9.) „Nomotop“.


You (**) have never heard of Herder? Are you sure that you are an ILP member? Have you ever herad of philosophy?


I am not a Kantian and not a Schopenhauerian. Other famous Prussian German philosphers are Christian Wolff, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (more Brandenburgian than Prussian), Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (more Prussian-Saxon than mere Prussian), Oswald A. G. Spengler (also more Prussian-Saxon than mere Prussian). Do you know them? Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was a Swabian, not a Prussian, but he became a „Swabian in Prussian commission“.


The internet, mass communication, multi-culturalism, feminism, and other isms are the current means or tools of control and - of course - the accompanying symptoms of the current Occident.


According to Peter Sloterdijk human beings live in symbolic immune systems and in ritual hulls / shells. If it is right that humans yield or produce humans, then they do it not mainly by work and its products and also not by work on themselves or by „interaction“ or „communication“; they do it by their lives in exercises / trainings. So humans arise out of repetitions /recurrences, Sloterdijk says.


Yes, that's right: „Kant pointed to the necessity of that 3rd element, »relevance« or usefulness. He proclaimed that it is of necessity that we presume causality. And in that regard, he was right. But that doesn't exactly answer whether causality is true, but merely why we accept it as true.“ (**). Is causality true? Is an exact answer possible?


First Kant was an enlightener („Aufklärer“), then he was an idealist because he stopped or overcame the era of enlightenment and started the era of the post-enlightenment idealism („post“ because there were some idealists long before Kant, for example Leibniz). In any case, Kant was the „father of the modernity“. I guess that, if you had lived at Kant's time, you would have tried to prolong the era of enlightenment by saying „yes“ to the question „is causality true?“. Kant referred to the epistemology, to the knowledge, thus also to causality but not so much to the metaphysical question of the truth of causality. After Kant the question of a true causality has been occurring again - similar to the time before Kant but (and that is the huge difference) by referring to Kant, thus not without Kant’s philosophy.

A rational ontology includes causality, yes. But does it really make the causality true? One could also say that we accept the world as the truth but do not know whether it is the truth or not.

According to the question of truth there are four answerse possible:

1) There is truth.
2) There is only truth outside of the (brains of the) subjects. This answer is philosophically called objectivism.
3) There is only truth in the (brains of the) subjects. This answer is philosophically called subjectivism, as an extreme form: solipsism.
4) There is no truth.

So we have one absolute affirmation (see: 1), two relative affirmations / negations (see: 2 and 3), and one absolute negation (see: 4)

It seems that no one of them can be proved or disproved.
__________________________

In summation: Kant was right.


Kant referred to both indeterminism and determinism, because he taught (1) an empirical (thus: close to nature) person and (2) an ethical (thus: close to culture) person. So according to Kant humans are citizens of two „worlds“: (1) a „visible world“ and (2) an „intelligible world“. The humans as (1) empirical (natural) persons or citizens of the „visible world“ do not have an „absolute free will“ becaue they are subordinated by nature and its „law“ of causality; but the humans as (2) ethical (cultural) persons or as citizens of the „intelligible world“ have an „absolute free will“. The „moral law“ is based only on the existence of the „intelligible freedom“(=> 2).

Ted Honderich wrote:
„One summary of the great Kant's view, to the extent that it can be summed up, is that he takes determinism to be a kind of fact, and indeterminism to be another kind of fact, and our freedom to be a fact too -- but takes this situation to have nothing to do with the kind of compatibility of determinism and freedom proclaimed by such Compatibilists as Hobbes and Hume. Thus Kant does not make freedom consistent with determinism by taking up a definition of freedom as voluntariness -- at bottom, being able to do what you want. This he dismisses as a wretched subterfuge, quibbling about words. Rather, the freedom he seeks to make consistent with determinism does indeed seem to be the freedom of the Incompatibilists -- origination. Is he then an Incompatibilist? Well, against that, it can be said he does not allow the existence of origination in what can be called the world we know, as Incompatibilists certainly do.“

Kant's main idea, whatever sense can finally be made of it, depends on his fundamental two-worlds doctrine. He locates determinism in the empirical world or world of appearances, and freedom in the world of things-in-themselves, the world of reason. It is important that the latter world is not in time.

So he is a determinist of a kind, opposed to the tradition of Compatibilism, not really in the Incompatibilist tradition, but tries to make his determinism and freedom-as-origination consistent by his own private means. You may well wonder if he can succeed in all this -- and suspect too, at the beginning of the 21st Century, that something so radical as his view is actually needed.“ **

Who ist Ted Honderich?

Wikipedia wrote:
„Ted Honderich (born 30 January 1933) is a Canadian-born British philosopher, Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic, University College London[1] and Visiting Professor, University of Bath. His work has been mainly about five things: determinism's truth and its consequences for our lives; the nature of consciousness and its relation to the brain; right and wrong in the contemporary world, in particular with respect to terrorism; the supposed justifications of punishment by the state; and the political tradition of conservatism.“ **

Excerpt from The Critique of Pure Reason:

Immanuel Kant wrote:

„.... Every human being has an empirical character for his power of choice, which is nothing other than a certain causality of his reason, insofar as in its effects in appearance this reason exhibits a rule, in accordance with which one could derive the rational grounds and the actions themselves according to their kind and degree, and estimate the subjective principles of his power of choice. Because this empirical character itself must be drawn from appearances as effect, and from the rule which experience provides, all the actions of the human being in appearance are determined in accord with the order of nature by his empirical character and the other cooperating causes; and if we could investigate all the appearances of his power of choice down to their basis, then there would be no human action that we could not predict with certainty, and recognize as necessary given its preceding conditions. Thus in regard to this empirical character there is no freedom, and according to this character we can consider the human being solely by observing, and, as happens in anthropology, by trying to investigate the moving causes of his actions physiologically

But if we consider the very same actions in relation to reason, not, to be sure, in relation to speculative reason, in order to explain them as regards their origin, but insofar as reason is the cause of producing them by themselves — in a word, if we compare them with reason in a practical respect — then we find a rule and order that is entirely other than the natural order. For perhaps everything that has happened in the course of nature, and on empirical grounds inevitably had to happen, nevertheless ought not to have happened. At times, however, we find, or at least believe we have found, that the ideas of reason have actually proved their causality in regard to the actions of human beings as appearances, and that therefore these actions have occurred not through empirical causes, no, but because they were determined by grounds of reason.

Suppose now that one could say reason has causality in regard to appearance; could reason’s action then be called free even though in its empirical character (in the mode of sense) it is all precisely determined and necessary? The empirical character is once again determined in the intelligible character (in the mode of thought). We are not acquainted with the latter, but it is indicated through appearances, which really give only the mode of sense (the empirical character) for immediate cognition. Now the action, insofar as it is to be attributed to the mode of thought as its cause, nevertheless does not follow from it in accord with empirical laws, i.e. in such a way that it is preceded by the conditions of pure reason, but only their effects in the appearance of inner sense precede it. Pure reason, as a merely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the form of time, and hence not subject to the conditions of the temporal sequence. The causality of reason in the intelligible character does not arise or start working at a certain time in producing an effect. For then it would itself be subject to the natural law of appearances, to the extent that this law determines causal series in time, and its causality would then be nature and not freedom.

Thus we could say that if reason can have causality in regard to appearances, then it is a faculty through which the sensible condition of an empirical series of effects first begins. For the condition that lies in reason is not sensible and does not itself begin. Accordingly, there takes place here what we did not find in any empirical series: that the condition of a successive series of occurrences could itself be empirically unconditioned. For here the condition is outside the series of appearances (in the intelligible) and hence not subject to any sensible condition or to any determination of time through any passing cause.

Nevertheless, this very same cause in another relation also belongs to the series of appearances. The human being himself is an appearance. His power of choice has an empirical character, which is the (empirical) cause of all his actions. There is not one of these conditions determining human beings according to this character which is not contained in the series of natural effects and does not obey the laws of nature according to which no empirically unconditioned causality is present among the things that happen in time. Hence no given action (since it can be perceived only as appearance) can begin absolutely from itself. But of reason one cannot say that before the state in which it determines the power of choice, another state precedes in which this state itself is determined. For since reason itself is not an appearance and is not subject at all to any conditions of sensibility, no temporal sequence takes place in it even as to its causality, and thus the dynamical law of nature, which determines the temporal sequence according to rules, cannot be applied to it.

Reason is thus the persisting condition of all voluntary actions under which the human being appears. Even before it happens, every one of these actions is determined beforehand in the empirical character of the human being. In regard to the intelligible character, of which the empirical one is only the sensible schema, no before or after applies, and every action, irrespective of the temporal relation in which it stands to other appearances, is the immediate effect of the intelligible character of pure reason; reason therefore acts freely, without being determined dynamically by external or internal grounds temporally preceding it in the chain of natural causes, and this freedom of reason can not only be regarded negatively, as independence from empirical conditions (for then the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of appearances), but also indicated positively by a faculty of beginning a series of occurrences from itself, in such a way that in reason itself nothing begins, but as the unconditioned condition of every voluntary action, it allows of no condition prior to it in time, whereas its effect begins in the series of appearances, but can never constitute an absolutely first beginning in this series.

In order to clarify the regulative principle of reason through an example of its empirical use — not in order to confirm it (for such proofs are unworkable for transcendental propositions) — one may take a voluntary action, e.g. a malicious lie, through which a person has brought about a certain confusion in society; and one may first investigate its moving causes, through which it arose, judging on that basis how the lie and its consequences could be imputed to the person. WIth this first intent one goes into the sources of the person’s empirical character, seeking them in a bad upbringing, bad company, and also finding them in the wickedness of a natural temper insensitive to shame, partly in carelessness and thoughtlessness; in so doing one does not leave out of account the occasioning causes. In all this one proceeds as with any investigation in the series of determining causes for a given natural effect.

Now even if one believes the action to be determined by these causes, one nonetheless blames the agent, and not on account of his unhappy natural temper, not on account of the circumstances influencing him, not even on account of the life he has led previously; for one presupposes that it can be entirely set aside how that life was constituted, and that the series of conditions that transpired might not have been, but rather that this deed could be regarded as entirely unconditioned in regard to the previous state, as though with that act the agent had started a series of consequences entirely from himself.

This blame is grounded on the law of reason, which regards reason as a cause that, regardless of all the empirical conditions just named, could have and ought to have determined the conduct of the person to be other than it is. And indeed one regards the causality of reason not as a mere concurrence with other causes, e but as complete in itself, even if sensuous incentives were not for it but were indeed entirely against it; the action is ascribed to the agent’s intelligible character: now, in the moment when he lies, it is entirely his fault; hence reason, regardless of all empirical conditions of the deed, is fully free, and this deed is to be attributed entirely to its failure to act.“

Excerpt from The Critique of Practical Reason:

Immanuel Kant wrote:

„The concept of causality as natural necessity, as distinguished from the concept of causality as freedom, concerns only the existence of things insofar as it is determinable in time and hence as appearances, as opposed to their causality as things in themselves. Now, if one takes the determinations of the existence of things in time for determinations of things-in-themselves (which is the most usual way of representing them), then the necessity in the causal relation can in no way be united with freedom; instead they are opposed to each other as contradictory. For, from the first it follows that every event, and consequently every action that takes place at a point of time, is necessary under the condition of what was in the preceding time. Now, since time past is no longer within my control, every action that I perform must be necessary by determining grounds that are not within my control, that is, I am never free at the point of time in which I act.

Indeed, even if I assume that my whole existence is independent from any alien cause (such as God), so that the determining grounds ot my causality and even of my whole existence are not outside me, this would not in the least transform that natural necessity into freedom. For, at every point of time I still stand under the necessity of being determined to action by that which is not within my control, and the series of events infinite a parte priori which I can only continue in accordance with a predetermined order would never begin of itself: it would be a continuous natural chain, and therefore my causality would never be freedom.

If, then, one wants to attribute freedom to a being whose existence is determined in time, one cannot, so far at least, except this being from the law of natural necessity as to all events in its existence and consequently as to its actions as well; for, that would be tantamount to handing it over to blind chance. But since this law unavoidably concerns all causality of things so far as their existence in time is determinable, if this were the way in which one had to represent also the existence of these things-in-themselves then freedom would have to be rejected as a null and impossible concept.

Consequently, if one still wants to save it, no other path remains than to ascribe the existence of a thing so far as it is determinable in time, and so too its causality in accordance with the law of natural necessity, only to appearance, and to ascribe freedom to the same being as a thing-in-itself. This is certainly unavoidable if one wants to maintain both these mutually repellent concepts together; but in application, when one wants to explain them as united in one and the same action, and so to explain this union itself, great difficulties come forward, which seem to make such a unification unfeasible.

If I say of a human being who commits a theft that this deed is, in accordance with the natural law of causality, a necessary result of determining grounds in preceding time, then it was impossible that it could have been left undone; how, then, can appraisal in accordance with the moral law make any change in it and suppose that it could have been omitted because the law says that it ought to have been omitted? That is, how can that man be called quite free at the same point of time and in regard to the same action in which and in regard to which he is nevertheless subject to an unavoidable natural necessity?

It is a wretched subterfuge to seek to evade this by saying that the kind of determining grounds of his causality in accordance with natural law agrees with a comparative concept of freedom, according to which that is sometimes called a free effect, the determining natural ground of which lies within the acting being, e.g., that which a projectile accomplishes when it is in free motion, in which case one uses the word »freedom« because while it is in flight it is not impelled from without; or as we also call the motion of a clock a free motion because it moves the hands itself, which therefore do not need to be pushed externally; in the same way the actions of the human being, although they are necessary by their determining grounds which preceded them in time, are yet called free because the actions are caused from within, by representations produced by our own powers, whereby desires are evoked on occasion of circumstances and hence actions are produced at our own discretion.

Some still let themselves be put off by this subterfuge and so think they have solved, with a little quibbling about words, that difficult problem on the solution of which millennia have worked in vain and which can therefore hardly be found so completely on the surface, That is to say, in the question about that freedom which must be put at the basis of all moral laws and the imputation appropriate to them, it does not matter whether the causality determined in accordance with a natural law is necessary through determining grounds lying within the subject or outside him, or in the first case whether these determining grounds are instinctive or thought by reason, if, as is admitted by these men themselves, these determining representations have the ground of their existence in time and indeed in the antecedent state; and this in turn in a preceding state, and so forth.

These determinations may be internal and they may have psychological instead of mechanical causality, that is, produce actions by means of representations and not by bodily movements; [still] they are always determinining grounds of the causality of a being insofar as its existence is determinable in time and therefore under the necessitating conditions of past time, which are thus, when the subject is to act, no longer within his control and which may therefore bring with them psychological freedom (if one wants to use this term for a merely internal chain of representations in the soul) but nevertheless natural necessity; and they therefore leave no transcendental freedom, which must be thought as independence from everything empirical and so from nature generally, whether it is regarded as an object of inner sense in time only or also of outer sense in both space and time; without this freedom (in the latter and proper sense), which alone is practical a priori, no moral law is possible and no imputation in accordance with it.

Just for this reason, all necessity of events in time in accordance with the natural law of causality can be called the mechanism of nature, although it is not meant in this that the things which are subject to it must be really material machines. Here one looks only to the necessity of the connection of events in a time series as it develops in accordance with natural law, whether the subject in which this development takes place is called automaton materiale, when the machinery is driven by matter, or with Leibniz spirituale, when it is driven by representations; and if the freedom of our will were none other than the latter (say, psychological and comparative but not also transcendental, i.e., absolute), then it would at bottom be nothing better than the freedom of a turnspit, which, when once it is wound up, also accomplishes its movements of itself.

Now, in order, in the case at hand, to remove the apparent contradiction between the mechanism of nature and freedom in one and the same action, one must recall what was said in the Critique of Pure Reason or follows from it: that the natural necessity which cannot coexist with the freedom of the subject attaches merely to the determinations of a thing which stands under conditions of time and so only to the determinations of the acting subject as appearance, and that, accordingly, the determining grounds of every action of the subject so far lie in what belongs to past time and is no longer within his control (in which must be counted his past deeds and the character as a phenomenon thereby determinable for him in his own eyes).

But the very same subject, being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing-in-itself, also views his existence insofar as it does not stand under conditions of time and himself as determinable only through laws that he gives himself by reason; and in this existence of his nothing is, for him, antecedent to the determination of his will, but every action — and in general every determination of his existence changing conformably with inner sense, even the whole sequence of his existence as a sensible being — is to be regarded in the consciousness of his intelligible existence as nothing but the consequence and never as the determining ground of his causality as a noumenon.

So considered, a rational being can now rightly say of every unlawful action he performed that he could have omitted it even though as appearance it is sufficiently determined in the past and, so far, is inevitably necessary; for this action, with all the past which determines it, belongs to a single phenomenon of his character, which he gives to himself and in accordance with which he imputes to himself, as a cause independent of all sensibility, the causality of those appearances.

The judicial sentences of that wonderful capacity in us which we call conscience are in perfect agreement with this. A human being may use what art he will to paint some unlawful conduct he remembers as an unintentional fault — as a mere oversight which one can never avoid altogether, and so as something in which he was carried away by the stream of natural necessity — and to declare himself innocent of it. He nevertheless finds that the advocate who speaks in his favor can by no means reduce to silence the prosecutor within him, if only he is aware that at the time he did this wrong he was in his senses, that is, had the use of his freedom; and while he explains his misconduct by certain bad habits, which by gradual neglect of attention he has allowed to grow in him to such a degree that he can regard his misconduct as their natural consequence, yet this cannot protect him from the reproach and censure he casts upon himself.

This is also the ground of repentance for a deed long past at every recollection of it, a painful feeling aroused by the moral disposition, which is empty in a practical way to the extent that it cannot serve to undo what has been done and would even be absurd. (Priestley, a genuine fatalist proceeding consistently, declares it absurd; and for this candor he deserves more applause than those who, while maintaining the mechanism of the will in deeds but its freedom in words, yet want it to be thought that they include it in their syncretistic system, though without making the possibility of such imputation comprehensible.) But repentance, as pain, is still quite legitimate because reason, when it is a question of the law of our intelligible existence (the moral law), recognizes no distinction of time and asks only whether the event belongs to me as a deed and, if it does, then always connects the same feeling with it morally, whether it was done just now or long ago. For, the sensible ljfe has, with respect to the intelligible consciousness of its existence (consciousness of freedom), the absolute unity of a phenomenon, which, so far as it contains merely appearances of the disposition that the moral law is concerned with (appearances of the character), must be appraised not in accordance with the natural necessity that belongs to it as appearance but in accordance with the absolute spontaneity of freedom.

One can therefore grant that if it were possible for us to have such deep insight into a human being’s cast of mind, as shown by inner as well as outer actions, that we would know every incentive to action, even the smallest, as well as all the external occasions affecting them, we could calculate a human being’s conduct for the future with as much certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse and could nevertheless maintain that the human being’s conduct is free. If, that is to say, we were capable of another view, namely an intellectual intuition of the same subject (which is certainly not given to us and in place of which we have only the rational concept), then we would become aware that this whole chain of appearances, with respect to all that the moral law is concerned with, depends upon the spontaneity of the subject as a thing-in-itself, for the determination of which no physical explanation can be given.

In default of this intuition, the moral law assures us of this difference between the relation of our actions as appearances to the sensible being of our subject and relation by which this sensible being is itself referred to the intelligible substratum in us. From this perspective, which is natural to our reason though inexplicable, appraisals can be justified which, though made in all conscientiousness, yet seem at first glance quite contrary to all equity. There are cases in which human beings, even with the same education that was profitable to others, yet show from childhood such early wickedness and progress in it so continuously into their adulthood that they are taken to be born villains and quite incapable of improvement as far as their cast of mind is concerned; and nevertheless they are so judged for what they do or leave undone that they are censured as guilty of their crimes; indeed, they themselves (the children) find these censures as well founded as if, despite the hopeless natural constitution of minds ascribed to the, they remained as accountable as any other human being.

This could not happen if we did not suppose that whatever arises from one’s choice (as every action intentionally performed undoubtedly does) has as its basis a free causality which from early youth expresses its character in its appearances (actions); these actions, on account of the uniformity of conduct, make knowable a natural connection that does not, however, make the vicious constitution of the will necessary but is instead the consequence of the evil and unchangeable principles freely adopted, which make it only more culpable and deserving of punishment.“


Hume said that there is no knowledge or epistemology of causality by reason / rationality but only by experience. So according to Hume cause and effects can not be discovered by mere reason / rationality but merely by experience. He said that there is no knowledge or epistemology by reason / rationality / a priori.


Hume was a diplomat, and, although he was also a philosopher of the Occidental Enlightenment, he was not a good logician, not a good rationalist, and thus not a good proponent of the Enlightenment. According tu Hume thinking is not more than a function, for example in order to link / join / connect, to shift / convert / permute, to widen / extend / expand, or to cut / shrink / reduce what the senses and experience liver. So according to Hume thinking (logic, rationality, ..., thus just the characteristics of the Occidental Enlightenment) is less important than senses and experience; according to Hume thinking is merely a slave of senses and experience.


If there is no Western philosopher greater than Kant, then there is no philosopher greater than Kant.


Perhaps Leibniz war greater than Kant ... (!) ... (?) ...(!). But Leibniz was a Western philosopher - like Kant.


Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) was an universal genius; he was a philosopher, the originator of the monadology and of the pre-established harmony, he was a scientist, especially a mathematician, the originator of the infinitesimal calculus (1665, published 1684), a physicist, and a historician, he was a technician, he was the builder of the first mechanical calculator, a machine of multiplication, he was a diplomat and a political consultant.

Okay, Leibniz lived from 1646 to 1716 and Kant from 1724 to 1804 - so according to that birth-and-death dates they are not as much comparable as they are according to other facts, So Leibniz was much more a scientist (mathematician, physicist, historcian) and technician than Kant, because Leibniz was an universal genius and one of the greatest scientists and technicians ever, whereas Kant was merely an average scientist and even no technician - and that does not necessarily or even automatically mean that Kant was a greater philosopher than Leibniz.

But perhaps you are right by saying that Kant was the greatest Western philosopher.

And what about Hegel?


By the way:

Heinrich Heine compared Kant with the French revolution, Fichte with the Napoleonic empire, Schelling with the Restauration, but in Hegel he saw the philosophical king, the finisher of all philosophical revolutions, of all philosophy. - Compare: Heinrich Heine, Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland (Religion and Philosophy in Germany), 1834, S. 33-34.

Right or wrong - it is an interesting comparison.


The time of GREAT philosophy ended at about 1800 when the NIHILISTIC philosophy started. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi used the word „Nihilismus“ („nihilism“) already 1799 in his „Sendschreiben an Fichte“. So since about 1800 or e.g. with Schopenhauer's „Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung“ (1818) there have been being either nihilistic or just eclecticistic philosophers. We really have to separate the period of pre-nihilistic philosophy from the period of nihilistic philosophy in that case.

It may be up to each person to value that. The historians of philosophy, provided that they are not corrupt, speak more about facts than values.


Nietzsche turned Schopenhauer's pessimism into optimism but remained a Schopenhauerian.


The more change the more cycle.
The more development the more repetition.
The more evolution the more mimicry.
The more history the more eclectics and eclecticists.

It is not Kant's fault that he lived later than the first philosophers of human history.

Kant was a typical Occidental philosopher; he was an enlightener and at last an overcomer of enlightenment, the first modern, especially modern-idealistic philosopher of the Occidental culture.

Some thoughts of Kant can be found in Ancient thoughts too, but that is not preventable, if they are not too many and not core-thoughts. Kant thoughts and ideas were Occidental thoughts and ideas, regardless of whether he had some Ancient non-core-thoughts too.

History shows the greatness of philosophers.

The current world institutions like UNO, WTO, World Bank, and many other global institutions have their origin in Kant's philosophy. Compare for example Kant's „Ewigen Frieden“ (1795) - „Perpetual Peace“ (1795). How to value it is one point, but the historical fact of the influence is another point. Another example: Platon was probably the greatest Ancient philosopher, but would you live according to his philosophy, especially his ideas, today, just because he was probably the greatest Ancient philosopher? To value philosophies are meaningful in another sense but not in the sense of greatness.


I say that Kant belongs to the pre-nihilistic period and in his latest stage also to the nihilistic period whereas Nietzsche belongs merely to the nihilistic period.


Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche:
1) What did he say about the philosophy of technique / technology / engineering?
- Nothing at all.
2) What did he say about the philosophy of physics / kosmology / astronomy?
- Nearly nothing.
3) What did he say about the philosophy of economy / economics?
- Nearly nothing.
4) What did he say about the philosophy of sociology?
- Not much (his statements about the fact that he was really terrified of socialism have not much to do with sociology).
5) What did he say about the philosophy of law / right?
- Not much (his statements about ethics and moral have not much to do with law / right - but much with his concept "will to power").
6) What did he say about epistemology?
- Not much.
....

„Wenn »es« den Menschen »gibt«, dann nur, weil eine Technik ihn aus der Vormenschheit hervorgebracht hat. Sie ist das eigentlich Menschen-Gebende .... Technik, hat Heidegger doziert, ist eine Weise der Entbergung. Sie holt Ergebnisse ans Licht, die von ihnen selbst her so nicht und nicht zu dieser Zeit an den Tag gekommen wären.“ - Peter Sloterdijk, Nicht gerettet - Versuche nach Heidegger, 2001, S. 224, 228.
Translation:
„If there »is« the human being, then only because the technique / technology has brought him out of the pre-humankind. That is actually the human-giver. .... Technique / technology, Heidegger has teached, is a way of unconcealing. It brings results to light that would not have come to light by themselves and not at that time.“


Here are some examples of modern Occidental imperatives like Kant's Categorical Imperative and other's imperatives:
(1) „Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction.“
(2) „Be revolutionary.“
(3) „Trust in the absolute spirit and the dialectic processes.“
(4) „Relinquish.“
(5) „Be yourself.“
(6) „Persevere.“
(7) „Be autarkic as much as you can.“
(8) „Take care of you, your relatives and dependants, your surrounding and ecolgical environment.“
(9) „Participate in the discourse.“
(10) „Take care of your foam, because you live in it.“
....

That all leads always to the same imperative, namely Kant's Categorical Imperative.

The first formulation: „Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction.“
The second formulation: „Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.“
The thrid formulation: „Therefore, every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends.“

The first formulation of the Categorical Imperative appears similar to the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule or ethic of reciprocity is a maxim, ethical code or morality.

The Golden Rule (in its positive form) says: „Treat others how you wish to be treated.“ One should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself (directive form).
The Golden Rule (in its negative form) says: „Do not impose on others what you do not wish for yourself.“ One should not treat others in ways that one would not like to be treated (cautionary form, also known as the Silver Rule).


Augustinus is right: Prosperity inevitably leads to depravity.


Nietzsche was a nihilist respectively - because he was at least „a little bit“ a philosopher - a nihilstic philosopher.

If Nietzsche had been an ILP member, in which subforum would he have posted the most?

Fact is that Kant had an entire philosophical system and that Hegel was the last philosopher who had an entire philosophical system. Since then there has never been a an entiere philosophical system and all entire philosophical systems have systematically or not systematically been deconstructed or destroyed - by nihilists respectively nihilistic philosophers.

Philosophy was „born“ in the Ancient Greece and means „love to wisdom“ („to“ - not „of“). So we have to interpret and measure philosophy and philosophers mainly according to the Ancient Greek interpretation. So Nietzsche's question „Were there already such philosophers?“ (in: Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 211, my translation) is more rhetoric than a serious question, because Nietzsche wanted the philosophers to be „commanders and lawgivers“ (ibid) and the philosophy to be a „hammer“ (ibid.). According to the the Ancient Greek definition of „philosophy“ and „philosophers“ philosophers are primarily not „commanders and lawgivers“; and when philosophy comes in like a „hammer“, then it is not a real philosophy but a nihilistic philosophy .

If Nietzsche is a member of the „third league of philosophy“, then Kant is the „champion“ of the „first league of philosophy“.


Criticism, scepticism, and (as the extreme form) nihilism are historically justified as well but lack of solutions - that's tautological, because they are what they are: criticism, scepticism, nihilism. The solutions come from history itself. The „next Kant“ will come in about 2000 years or will not come (because humans will be too stupid or not live anymore).


In a world of a society that lives in a „foam“ (Peter Sloterdijk), everything has merely „little stability or even meaning“.


Will there ever be any tiny institution with an origin in Nietzsche's philosophy?


Hegel was the last philosopher with a philosophical system. It is always easy to follow criticism, especially social criticism, but criticism is no philosophical system, often even not or merely a little bit philosophy.


In modern times critique is very fashionable and popular, but it makes a philosopher not necessarily, not automatically better or even greater. In the first place critique is only critique; in the second place it may lead to a philosophical system, and it did in Kant's case, but it did not in all cases after Hegel, thus it also did not in the cases Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.

Persoanlly I can say (for example): „I am not a Kantian, I am not a Hegelian, I am not a Schopenhauerian / Nietzschean / Sloterdijkian“ or the reverse; but as an Occidental human I have to say: „I am a Kantian, and I am a Hegelian“, because Kant and Hegel have influenced the Occidental culture vehemently but Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Sloterdijk merely a little bit.

When the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt met the Chinese communistic leader Mao Tsetung (Zedong) in the middle 1970's, Mao Tsetung said to him: „You are a Kantian“; and Helmut Schmidt responded: „Yes, and you are a Konfuzian (Confucian)“. Kant is typical Occidental, Konfuzius (Confucius) is typical Chinese - each of both influenced his culture more than anyone else of his culture. And by the way: Mao Tsetung, although he was a communist (thus an ideologist of an Occidental ideology), did not contradict Helmut Schmidt.


Kant's Categorical Imperative is expandable.


Kant was the first philosopher who showed that also the philosophy can come to an end. After having its climax the philosophy became more and more redundant and at last something like a „pensioner“. It was not a coincidence that Kant was a contemporary of Mozart, Hegel a contemporary of Beethoven, and Nietzsche a contemporary of Brahms - and by the way: Sloterdijk is a contemporary of Zappa ....


No one of the skepticists has ever achieved and will never achieve such a huge influence that Kant has achieved. And that belongs to the answer of the question in the topic of this thread. I remind you again: please refer to the topic. This little philosophers you mean are dwarfs in comparison to Kant.


In the 1790's Johann Gottlieb Fichte was accused of atheism. And because of this Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi used also the word „Nihilismus“ („nihilism“) in his „Sendschreiben an Fichte“ (1799). I know for a fact that at least since then the God-is-dead-philosophem has been knowing and keeping in mind. Later, Nietzsche just repeated it, but he did it with much language violence, because he was powerfully eloquent.


Please show me one moral, if it both works and is not derivable from Kant's Categorical Imperative


Nietzscheans use and Nietzscheanists misuse Nietzsche in the same way as (for example) Marxians use and Marxists misuse Marx. There is no difference at all when it comes to use or misuse idols, false gods. And because of this religious behavior, their religious delirium, they „make mountains out of molehills“.


Leibniz' philosophy contains all things philosophy needs, thus also mathematics. After Leibniz mathematics vanished from philosophy. Kant's philosophy contains all things philosophy needs except mathematics, thus Kant's philosophy contains also physics / cosmology / astronomy. After the middle (not the late) Kant physics / cosmology / astronomy vanished from philosophy. So the base of metaphysics vanished - which necessarily means: nihilism. A philosophy without any metaphysics is not a complete philosophy anymnore. Since then the nihilistic philosophy has been triumphing over the non-nihilistic philosophy as the very much more real philosophy, the destruction has been triumphing over the construction, the chaos has been triumphing over the order, the emotion has been triumphing over the logic, ..., and so on.

Nihilistic philosophy has merely a litte bit to do with philosophy. The greater or better philosopher can never be a nihilistic philosopher. A partly destroyed house can never be the greater or better house.


Nietzsche was not the only, not the best, and even not the frist one who negated the negation by affirmation


Trying to compare a nihilistic philosopher with a non-nhilistic philosopher is difficult but not impossible.

There is realitiy, and so there is objectivity. There should be science, thus there should be history too. Thers is still science, thus there is still history too. We have logic, empirical evidence, and history in order to know that a nihilistic philosopher can never be the greater or better philosopher. Nihilistic philosophy has merely a litte bit to do with philosophy.

Nihilistic philosophers may be more sympathic - and in nihlistic times they mostly are, at least for other nihilists -, but they can never be the greater or better philosophers.

It is the definition itself that makes it impossible to really have a little philosophy as the greatest or better philosophy


The dialectic process as Hegel's method is pretty fundamental. One can not deny it. It is true. it is true in the sense that Hegel meant.


Kant argued that a too speculative metaphysics which his philosophical predecessors excessively used is not able to realise without any perception. Many of his philosophical predecessors had tried to realise God by pure reason. Kant has changed the (concept of) metaphysics, because according to him metaphysics should not longer be the „science of the absolute“ what it had been to all his philosophical predecessors, the dogmatic philosophers. According to Kant metaphysics is the science of the knowledge borders. Kant re-created i.e. the epistemology, but he did not say that metaphysics in general is an impossibility. The epistemology is the „border police“against all pretension, hubris, border crossing beyond that what is experiencable, Kant said for example.


Schopenhauer used Kant's „Ding an sich“ for his „will“-concept.


<= || =>

- Register -

  Occidental culture